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This dissertation examines the impact of different types of alternative
transportation options on rates of drunk driving. The first chapter explores the
effect of ridesharing services such as Uber and Lyft on fatal alcohol-related auto
accidents and DUI/DWI arrests. This study uses a difference-in-differences
methodology and the gradual expansion of ridesharing to cities across the
U.S. to identify the impact of ridesharing. The second chapter estimates how
the development and expansion of public rapid transit systems affects fatal
alcohol-related auto accidents and DUI/DWI arrests. Utilizing the develop-
ment of rapid transit systems since the mid-1970s this study applies difference-
in-differences to estimate the causal effects on drunk driving measures. The
third and final chapter utilizes unique data on the home addresses of individ-
uals arrested for drunk driving to estimate the effect of late night bus service
on drunk driving arrests in Austin, Texas. The causal effects are estimated
using the differential availability of late-night bus service based on the day
iv
of the week and a difference-in-differences methodology based on whether or
not individuals live within walking distance of late-night routes. These three
studies can provide important evidence to policymakers in their efforts to curb
drunk driving, a problem which kills over 10,000 people and causes over $50




List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
Chapter 1. Driving Safety: An Empirical Analysis of Rideshar-
ing’s Impact on Drunk Driving and Alcohol-Related
Crime 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Existing Evidence on Effects of Drunk Driving Policies in
the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 History of Ridesharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Ridesharing Launch Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.3 Drunk Driving and other Crime Arrests . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.4 Public Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.1 Overall Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.2 Time-Varying Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5.3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6.1 Fatal Alcohol-Related Auto Accidents and DUI Arrests 27
1.6.1.1 Overall Drunk Driving Results . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6.1.2 Time-Varying Drunk Driving Results . . . . . . 32
1.6.1.3 Heterogeneity by Public Transit Quality . . . . 37
vi
1.6.2 Ridesharing and Other Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.6.2.1 Overall Other Crime Results . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.6.2.2 Time-Varying Other Crime Results . . . . . . . 43
1.7 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.7.1 Placebo Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.7.2 Non-Alcohol Related Fatal Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.7.3 Low-Cost Ridesharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7.4 Constant Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Chapter 2. Quantifying the Effect of Rapid Transit on Drunk
Driving 57
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2.1 Rapid Transit in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2.2 Drunk Driving in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Analytic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4.1 Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.2 DUI/DWI Arrests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.3 Rapid Transit System Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.1 Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.2 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.6.1 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
vii
Chapter 3. Residential Proximity to Late-Night Bus Routes in
Austin: Impact on DWI Arrests 81
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.1 Drunk Driving Prevalence and Prevention . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.2 Late-Night Buses in Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1 Econometric Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1.1 City-wide Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1.2 Zipcode-level Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.4.2 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5.1 City-wide Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5.2 Zipcode-level Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103




1.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Overall Effect on Drunk Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3 Effect on Drunk Driving at High-Risk Times and for High-Risk
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.4 Time-Varying Effect on Drunk Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5 Time-Varying Effect on Drunk Driving for High-Risk Times and
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6 Overall Ridesharing Effect by Transit Usage . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.7 Ridesharing’s Effect on Other Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.8 Time-Varying Effect on Other Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.9 Ridesharing’s Effect on Non-Alcohol Related Crashes . . . . . 48
1.10 Overall Effect on Drunk Driving - Low-Cost Services Separate 50
1.11 Overall Effect on Drunk Driving - Constant Sample . . . . . . 51
2.1 Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.2 Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Stations . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.3 Joint Impact of Rapid Transit Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Lines - Excluding Buses . 77
2.5 Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Lines - Date Clustering . . 79
3.1 Zipcode-Level Demographic Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Zipcode-Level Demographic Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 DWI Arrests Summary Statistics by Late-Night Bus Proximity
and Day of the Week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 City-wide Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests . . . . 99
3.5 City-wide Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests - Full FE 101
3.6 Zipcode-Level Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests . . 102
3.7 Zipcode-Level Effects on DWI Arrests - Full FE . . . . . . . . 103
3.8 City-wide Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests - Date
Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Growth of Ridesharing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Fatal Accident Pre-Ridesharing Trend Comparison . . . . . . 23
1.3 DUI Arrests Pre-Ridesharing Trend Comparison . . . . . . . . 24
1.4 Fatal Alcohol-Related Accidents Before and After Ridesharing
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 DUI Arrests Before and After Ridesharing Introduction . . . . 26
1.6 Placebo Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.7 Counter-Factual Fatal Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.8 Aggregate Economic Harm Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.9 Aggregate Economic Harm Reduction - Heterogeneous Effects 55
2.1 Number of Rapid Transit Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2 Number of Rapid Transit Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Average DWI Arrests by Day of the Week . . . . . . . . . . . 92
x
Chapter 1
Driving Safety: An Empirical Analysis of
Ridesharing’s Impact on Drunk Driving and
Alcohol-Related Crime
1.1 Introduction
Drunk driving is a significant problem in the United States. In the
U.S. in 2010, auto accidents caused by intoxicated drivers killed over 11,000
people and injured 326,000. The National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration (NHTSA) estimates the direct economic cost of these accidents at $44
billion and the total societal costs at $201 billion.1 In 2012, over 1.2 million
US drivers were arrested for drunk driving2, with the penalties for conviction
including fines and potential prison time. Drunk driving costs the U.S. tens of
thousands of lives and billions of dollars in law enforcement, property damage,
and lost productivity each year. Accordingly, methods to discourage intoxi-
cated driving are an important issue in public policy at the local, state, and
national levels.
1National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “The Economic and Societal Impact
Of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2010.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, May
2014, DOT HS 812 013. http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812013.pdf
2Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Crime in the United States: 2013.” Web. 26 May
2015.
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Most policies focus on deterrence through fear of punishment. Increas-
ing the penalties for drunk driving convictions through higher fines, more jail
time, and/or driver’s license confiscation serve to increase the expected cost
of a conviction. Increased police patrols, sobriety checkpoints, and no refusal
laws increase the probability of being caught should an individual choose to
drive drunk. These policies impose substantial costs on society, both through
public expenditures on police and courts and lost productivity of convicted
offenders. For example, Miller et. al. (1998) estimate the cost of operating
a single sobriety checkpoint for one hour at over $4,000, converted to 2016
dollars. Bouchery et al (2011) estimate the lost productivity due to alcohol-
related incarceration to be over $7.5 billion annually, converted to 2016 dollars.
Another avenue for public policy is to increase the convenience or de-
crease the cost of alternative forms of transportation, either public or pri-
vate. One such alternative that has garnered substantial attention recently is
ridesharing, as exemplified by companies such as Uber and Lyft. Ridesharing
services are private, for-hire transportation that operate similarly to traditional
taxis. One of the main advantages they provide over traditional taxis are their
real-time app-based dispatch systems, which allow riders to hail drivers from
their mobile device and know exactly when they will arrive. A second ma-
jor advantage is that in most cities ridesharing firms are not subject to the
same quantity constraints and licensing requirements as traditional taxis. This
means that the introduction of ridesharing can drastically increase the number
of for-hire cars available. A third advantage of ridesharing services is that they
2
are typically priced below the rates charged by traditional taxis. For example
a 10 minute, 3 mile ride in San Francisco would cost $9.70 using Uber3 but
over $11.75 using a traditional taxi4. The fourth advantage of ridesharing ser-
vices are their variable pricing structures. These allow for higher prices during
demand surges to incentivize more drivers to operate at those times. These
advantages of ridesharing relative to traditional taxis can both increase the
convenience and decrease the cost of private for-hire transportation relative to
driving a personal car.
In this paper I estimate the impact of ridesharing services on drunk
driving and other alcohol-related crimes. In particular I use a difference-in-
differences methodology to estimate the effect of introducing ridesharing on
the number of fatal alcohol-related auto accidents, the number of DUI arrests,
and the number of arrests for crimes such as physical and sexual assault in a
city. In a sample consisting of every U.S. city with a population of 100,000
or more, I find large reductions in both measures of drunk driving following
ridesharing’s launch. Using data from 2000-2014 and controlling for public
transportation availability, unemployment rates, and any time-invariant or
city-invariant factors I estimate that ridesharing reduces fatal alcohol-related
auto accidents by 10% to 11.4%. Separating out these effects by the length
of time these services have been operating, I show that the effects increase
over time. For DUI arrests the results reveal heterogeneous effects for cities
3Uber. ”San Francisco.” Web. 26 May 2015. https://www.uber.com/cities/san-francisco
4San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency. ”Taxi Rates.” Web. 26 May 2015.
http://www.sfmta.com/getting-around/taxi/taxi-rates
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with different levels of public transit quality. In cities with the highest transit
usage ridesharing has little effect on the number of DUI arrests. In cities
where transit is less utilized, however, ridesharing results in an 8.7% to 9.2%
reduction in DUI arrests. These large effects indicate ridesharing services may
be a potentially potent tool for reducing the incidence and harm of drunk
driving.
A common concern is that any benefits of ridesharing in terms of drunk
driving might be mitigated by increased levels of alcohol-related and rideshar-
ing driver-committed crime. The reasoning for the former is that by making
drinking outside the home more convenient, ridesharing might induce more
people to do so or encourage those who would otherwise have moderated their
alcohol intake to drink excessively. A larger number of intoxicated individuals
in public could result in an increase in alcohol-related crimes. The concerns
about ridesharing driver-committed crimes stem from the vetting process for
ridesharing drivers compared to that for traditional taxi drivers. Some have
worried that less stringent background checks could result in a risk of sexual
assaults perpetrated by drivers against their passengers. In this study I ex-
amine the effect ridesharing has had on each of these categories of crimes. I
find that contrary to these concerns, ridesharing actually corresponds with a
significant reduction in both physical and sexual assaults of 7.9% and 9.3%
respectively. I further find no change in arrests for other alcohol-related crimes
such as public drunkeness and liquor law violations after ridesharing introduc-
tion. These results indicate that the benefits of ridesharing availability extend
4
beyond just drunk driving prevention.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of ridesharing and the problem of drunk driving in the U.S. Section
3 describes the different data sources used in the analysis. Section 4 presents
the conceptual framework for the study. Section 5 describes the empirical
methodology. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 explores the robustness
of the estimates. Section 8 discusses the findings in the context of drunk
driving prevention strategies and quantifies the estimated benefits. Finally,
Section 9 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Existing Evidence on Effects of Drunk Driving Policies in the
U.S.
The United States faces a high incidence of drunk driving. In 2012,
an estimated 11.2% of all Americans drove under the influence of alcohol at
least once.5 Drunk driving accidents result in tens of thousands of deaths and
hundreds of thousands of injuries each year. The estimated economic costs of
these accidents range from $44 billion in direct costs to $201 billion in total
social costs.6 The incidence of drunk driving and the attendant costs vary
5Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2012
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings, NSDUH Series
H-46, HHS Publication No. (SMA) 13-4795. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, 2013.
6National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “The Economic and Societal Impact
Of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2010.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, May
2014, DOT HS 812 013. http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812013.pdf
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significantly across cities and regions. For example, Dallas experiences around
130 fatal alcohol-related accidents each year while comparably-sized San Diego
only has around 70 fatal accidents.7
Efforts to reduce drunk driving typically take the form of greater en-
forcement or stricter punishments. The severity of penalties for drunk driving
varies among states. For example, drunk driving in Georgia carries penalties
of a one year license suspension and vehicle confiscation in addition to poten-
tial fines and jail time. On the other hand, drunk driving in Maryland has
no vehicle confiscation or impounding and only a 45 day license suspension,
again in addition to potential fines and jail time.8
Accordingly, most of the research into drunk driving prevention has fo-
cused on policies that affect the severity and enforcement of anti-drunk driving
laws or that attempt to reduce alcohol consumption. Shults et al (2001) find
that police sobriety checkpoints reduce fatal drunk driving accidents by 18-
20%. Eisenberg (2003) finds that lowering the legal BAC limit from 0.10 to
0.08 reduces fatal alcohol-related accidents by 3.1%. Kenkel (1993) examines
the effect of both the nationwide standardization of the U.S. drinking age as
well as the wave of anti-drunk driving laws enacted during the 1980’s and he
finds that both policies significantly reduced rates of drunk driving. Villave-
ces et al (2003) examine other drunk driving prevention policies, finding that
7Fatal Accident Reporting System, 2000-2014. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration. Web. 26 Dec 2015.
8Governors Highway Safety Association. ”Drunk Driving Laws.” Web. 26 May 2015.
http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/impaired laws.html.
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administrative license revocation reduces fatal drunk driving accidents by 5%
while zero-tolerance laws reduce them by 12%.
Recently a small but growing literature has examined the impact of
transportation alternatives, including ridesharing services, on drunk driving
outcomes. Jackson and Owens (2011) estimate the effect of extending the
operating hours of Washington DC’s subway system on DUI arrests, fatal
alcohol-related auto accidents, and other alcohol-related arrests. They find
little city-wide effect of the extended subway hours on any of the outcomes.
However, in neighborhoods with bars in walking distance to subway stations
they find a decrease in DUI arrests and an increase in other alcohol-related
arrests. These results are consistent with the idea that increased convenience
of public transit reduces drunk driving, while also appearing to increase the
overall level of alcohol consumption.
Over the past year, a few studies have attempted to measure the effect
that ridesharing services like Uber have had on drunk driving and other crimes.
Greenwood and Wattal (2015) focus on Uber’s launch in different cities across
California and find that Uber’s low-cost Uber X service reduces alcohol-related
vehicle deaths by 3.6% - 5.6%. Dills and Mulholland (2016) expand on this
by extending the scope to a national sample of cities. Using data from 2010
through 2013 they find that Uber’s launch results in a reduction in DUI arrests,
fatal auto accidents, and arrests for assault and disorderly conduct. Unlike
Greenwood and Wattal (2015), however, they find no effect on alcohol related
fatal accidents. Most recently, Brazil and Kirk (2016) look at the impact of
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Uber’s entry on fatal accidents in the 100 most populous U.S. cities. Unlike the
prior two studies, the authors find no evidence of a reduction in fatal accidents,
whether alcohol-related or otherwise. These second two papers are limited to
observing traffic fatalities at the county rather than municipal level, potentially
reducing the precision of their estimates. Given the conflicting findings in the
existing literature, this study contributes by expanding the analysis to a larger
sample of U.S. cities for a longer time period. In addition, my drunk driving
measures are at the city level, where the impact of ridesharing services are more
likely to be concentrated. Furthermore, my study will measure more accurately
the presence of ridesharing services by incorporating launch dates for other
ridesharing firms in addition to Uber. Methodologically, my study expands
on the prior literature by testing for heterogeneous effects of ridesharing by
duration of operation and public transit availability. These factors should help
provide some clarity to the literature on ridesharing and drunk driving.
1.2.2 History of Ridesharing
Prior to the introduction of ridesharing services the forms of private
for-hire transportation available were limited to traditional taxis, limousines,
and larger vehicles such as bus and van services. Of these, only traditional
taxis did not need to be reserved in advance and all came at fairly substantial
costs. Furthermore, the for-hire transportation options and number of cars
available varied widely from city to city. Most municipalities heavily regulate
the traditional taxi industry, placing restrictions on the number of vehicles
8
that can operate, the prices they can charge, and the licensing and insurance
requirements for the drivers and cars. These restrictions, particularly on quan-
tity, can lead to shortages of traditional taxis during periods of high demand
such as late in the evening on Fridays and Saturdays after bars close or at the
end of large events.
In most cities in which they operate, ridesharing firms are not subject to
these same restrictions, allowing them to expand supply during periods of high
demand and adjust prices to encourage more riders or drivers to participate
in the market. Many major ridesharing companies adjust pricing in real time
to better match supply and demand, charging higher ”Surge Pricing” fares
during periods with high demand relative to supply.9 This serves to encourage
more drivers to operate during periods of high demand.
Uber was the first ridesharing firm in the U.S., launching in San Fran-
cisco in May 2010. They were followed two years later by Lyft and Sidecar.
Uber’s initial expansion was gradual, growing to cover nine city markets in
the two years between their launch and the launch of their competitors. After
the introduction of Lyft and Sidecar, ridesharing expanded rapidly across the
U.S. Cities served by ridesharing range from large metropolises like New York
and Los Angeles to small college towns like College Station, TX. By the the
end of 2014, ridesharing firms operated in about 80% of all U.S. cities with
9Uber. ”What is surge pricing?” Web. 25 Oct. 2016.
https://help.uber.com/h/34212e8b-d69a-4d8a-a923-095d3075b487
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a population of 100,000 or more.10 In many of these cities, ridesharing ser-
vices began operations months before city and state officials permitted them
to legally operate.11
1.3 Data
Below I describe the data sources I use for ridesharing launch dates,
alcohol-related fatal accidents, DUI and other alcohol-related crime arrests,
and public transit availability. I collected data for all 273 U.S. cities with popu-
lations of 100,000 or greater covering the years 2000 through 2014.12 I collected
city-level unemployment and population data for each of these cities.13 Table
1 presents summary statistics by year of ridesharing introduction. Rideshar-
ing firms appear to enter earlier in cities with larger populations, larger public
transit systems, and lower rates for fatal alcohol-related accidents and DUI
arrests. If the impact of ridesharing on drunk driving is positively correlated
with preexisting levels of drunk driving or negatively correlated with public
transit availability the magnitude of the results in this paper could represent
a lower bound for the effect in cities where ridesharing services have yet to
launch.
10The cities with at least 100,000 people covered by ridesharing as of December 2014
contained 24.7% of the U.S. population.
11This was the case in Milwaukee, Tampa Bay, Kansas City, several cities in Texas, and
many others.
12Population measured as of 2010 Census. Some of the detailed public transportation
network data as well as arrest data are not available for all cities due to voluntary reporting.
13Unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment
Statistics and the city population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No Launch
Launch Launch Launch Launch Launch By 2014
Fatal Crashes
Mean 0.41 0.65 0.59 0.86 0.99 1.02
Std. Dev. 0.64 0.79 0.76 1.12 1.13 1.21
DUI Arrests
Mean 18.28 13.13 36.36 25.76 30.26 36.73
Std. Dev. 12.72 17.87 23.36 16.56 19.08 38.49
Population
Mean 250,370 1,340,212 454,324 297,388 249,889 168,962
Std. Dev. 256,519 2,431,447 681,539 243,377 241,651 94,208
Unemployment Rate
Mean 5.77 5.72 5.20 6.42 6.12 6.08
Std. Dev. 2.12 1.97 2.05 3.10 2.61 2.55
Rail Transit Miles
Mean 42.38 126.66 47.54 24.01 3.46 2.48
Std. Dev. 42.61 140.43 54.80 49.18 12.97 14.61
Bus Transit Miles
Mean 955.4 2,048.3 2,073.4 1,148.6 663.5 363.2
Std. Dev. 546.8 2,227.3 1,617.6 1,295.3 647.4 366.7
Excl. Bus Miles
Mean 34.11 88.89 70.06 18.17 7.48 1.14
Std. Dev. 45.49 161.67 80.41 42.72 31.61 8.46
Fatal accidents and DUI arrests are monthly per 100,000 population.
Population statistics are based on 2010 Census.
The sample of cities contains all U.S. cities with 100,000 population or greater in 2010.
Transit mileage data are not available for all sample cities in all months.
All figures are monthly averages prior to May 2010, the date of first ridesharing introduction.
“Excl.” refers to exclusive right-of-way.
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1.3.1 Ridesharing Launch Dates
The two largest and longest-operating ridesharing services in the U.S.
are Uber and Lyft. Uber officially launched in San Francisco in 2010 followed
two years later by Lyft.14 Uber and Lyft regularly post announcements to their
websites when they launch in new cities. I collected all of the launch dates
contained in these announcements. Not all city launches are accompanied
by announcements so I supplement these data with news articles discussing
the launch for any remaining cities.15 There are a small number of cities for
which one or more ridesharing services launched but later suspended service.
I collected the date service was suspended for each of these cities. Figure
1 shows how the proportion of U.S. cities served by ridesharing services has
increased over time.16
1.3.2 Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities
Since 1975 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has collected detailed information on all fatal traffic accidents in the U.S. All
traffic accidents on publicly accessible roads resulting in at least one fatality in
all 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are recorded in
14A third service named Sidecar also launched in 2012 but struggled to grow along with
Uber and Lyft and has since ceased operations. I gathered launch data data for this company
as well.
15I supplement this further with data provided by representatives at Uber and Lyft for
any cities which did not have clearly published launch dates. This primarily pertains to
suburbs of larger cities.
16I include all cities with populations of 100,000 or more as of the 2010 Census.
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Figure 1.1: Growth of Ridesharing Services
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the NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) database17. This
database contains detailed information about the time, location, and other
important details regarding the accident and all of the vehicles and persons
involved. Importantly, it also includes data on whether any of the drivers in-
volved were under the influence of alcohol. These data are published annually
and I have collected them for the years 2000 through 2014, the last year for
which data are available. All of the data are at the incident level so I aggre-
gate them to monthly totals for each city. When the data contain geographic
coordinates I assign accidents to sample cities if they are within five miles of
the city centroid.18 When this information is not available I use the city and
state identifier codes contained in the FARS data to assign observations to the
appropriate city. Geographic coordinates are present in 92.2% of observations
in the sample period and in 98.2% of observations after 2001.
1.3.3 Drunk Driving and other Crime Arrests
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has collected data on arrests
for driving under the influence (DUI) and other crime categories from police
departments across the United States every year since 1930 under the Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) program. I gathered monthly arrest reports for all
available police agencies from 2000 through 2014, the last year of available
17The FARS data can be accessed using the NHTSA’s website at
http://http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS/.
18City centroid data are assembled from National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency data by
MaxMind Inc. and are available from http://www.maxmind.com/.
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data. Although participation in the UCR program is voluntary, over 18,000 law
enforcement agencies report arrest data under the program.19 Of the sample
of all U.S. cities with populations of 100,000 or more 45% report DUI arrests
for every month between 2000 and 2014, 77% report for at least 80% of these
months, and 10% do not report DUI arrests at all. Despite less than universal
reporting each month, the UCR data represent the most complete nationwide
collection of DUI and other crime arrest data available.20 To estimate the effect
of ridesharing services on arrests I determine the municipal police agency for
each of the sample cities that reports arrest data.
1.3.4 Public Transit
To properly estimate the effects of ridesharing on drunk driving out-
comes it is important to control for other factors that may affect drunk driving
as well. Quality public transportation has the potential to affect drunk driv-
ing rates by providing an alternative to driving when consuming alcohol.21 To
account for this I gathered detailed data on the size of each sample city’s pub-
lic transit system from the Federal Transit Administration’s National Transit
Database (NTD).22 Not every transit agency submits reports to the NTD;
these data are only available for 69% of the sample cities. For each city that
19Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reports. Web. 11 Dec 2015.
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr.
20Any city-month observations which are not present in the UCR data I treat as missing.




does report I gather information on the size of both their bus and rail transit
networks. I gather data on the number of ”directional route miles” for each
type of service as well as the number of miles for which buses have designated
right-of-way, meaning they do not share the road with other forms of traffic.
Directional route miles are the number of miles transit vehicles travel while
in revenue service. To ensure I have measures of transit availability for ev-
ery sample city I also gather data from each city’s transit authority on the
presence of rail transit services during the 2000-2014 time period. For each
city I record whether they have heavy rail and/or light rail services as well
as the date these services began operation, if that occurred within the sample
period.23
1.4 Conceptual Framework
In order to understand the effect ridesharing has on drunk driving it
is important to understand the decision process around alcohol consumption
and driving while intoxicated. This process involves multiple layers of choices
regarding the amount of alcohol to consume, both the a priori expectation as
well as the in-the-moment decision once drinking begins, as well as where to
drink and how to get there and back. Drunk driving occurs when a specific
combination of decisions are optimal for an individual.24 The person must
23Heavy rail transit such as subways and elevated trains have dedicated right-of-way as
well as longer and faster trains than light rail.
24”Optimal” refers to maximizing the individual’s expected utility given their preferences
and their perceptions about the risks and benefits associated with each action. It is possible
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optimally choose to consume more alcohol than would allow them to drive
legally. Again, this decision may take place prior to beginning drinking or it
can occur after the individual has already begun consuming alcohol. Drunk
drivers must select to drink outside their home and to drive themselves to that
location. Driving drunk carries with it several risks. There is a chance the
driver will be detected by law enforcement and face penalties including jail
time, fines, and license suspension. There is also an increased risk of accidents
and the injuries and property damage that go along with them.
Much of the public policy and research into drunk driving has focused
on policies and actions that affect the risk of being caught driving drunk
(Shultz et al (2001), Villaveces et al (2003), Chang et al (2011), Hansen
(2015)). Sobriety checkpoints, no-refusal25, increased police patrols, and sim-
ilar actions increase the probability of being detected when driving under the
influence. Other strategies affect the expected penalty from being caught.
Increasing the severity of punishment increases the expected cost of being de-
tected. The ultimate goal of such policies is to reduce the attractiveness of
driving drunk relative to other options such as reduced alcohol consumption,
drinking at home, or taking alternative transportation. These strategies have
the potential to be effective, as some of the research into them has shown.
Less focus has been placed on how increasing the attractiveness of alter-
that these risk perceptions differ (perhaps greatly) from the true riskiness of their actions.
25A no refusal law makes it illegal to refuse an alcohol breath test when suspected by a
police officer of driving drunk. In some states this is always in force, while in others it only
applies during certain designated time periods.
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native transportation may influence drunk driving. By improving the conve-
nience and/or lowering the cost of taking a transportation method other than
self-driving, some people who would have optimally chosen to drive drunk be-
fore may now choose to take alternative transportation instead. One common
concern with alcohol-related decisions is that perceived risks may be different
when under the influence of alcohol, potentially reducing the expected cost of
driving drunk thus increasing its attractiveness.26 This concern is mitigated
by the observation that the initial transportation decision will often be made
prior to the individual becoming intoxicated. Once the person has opted to
take alternative transportation to the location where they plan to drink al-
cohol they no longer have the option to drive drunk from that location on
their return trip. Improving the attractiveness of alternative transportation
will, ceteris paribus, weakly reduce the number of individuals who optimally
choose to drive drunk. The degree to which drunk driving is reduced depends
on how significant the improvement in alternative transportation attractive-
ness is, as well as the number of individuals who are on the margin between
driving drunk and taking alternative transport.
Another potential concern is that increasing the appeal of alternative
transportation could induce people to optimally consume more alcohol or in-
crease their likelihood of consuming alcohol outside the home. Greenfield
(1998) estimates that as much as 35% of violent crimes are committed by
26Many thanks to the seminar participants at The University of Texas at Austin for this
observation.
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individuals who have recently consumed alcohol. Accordingly, an increase in
alcohol use, particularly in public, might have the potential to increase the
incidence of crimes other than drunk driving. Some studies have examined
this possibility (Dills and Mullholland (2016), Jackson and Owens (2010))
with each finding differing results depending on the particular crimes and the
particular form of alternative transportation. For services like ridesharing the
exact effect on crime is unclear a priori. While lowering the cost of drinking ex-
cessively outside the home could increase the number of intoxicated people in
public, having lower cost and more convenient transportation available could
also allow people to return home more quickly and easily after they become
intoxicated, reducing the time they are in public and at risk of committing or
being the victim of a crime. Separating out these two competing forces is dif-
ficult, but it is possible to estimate the net effect of alternative transportation
services on the incidence of particular crimes.
1.5 Methodology
To estimate the effects of ridesharing services on drunk driving and
alcohol-related crime outcomes I use a fixed effects differences-in-differences
methodology. City fixed effects control for any time-invariant differences across
cities in the average level of drunk driving and other crimes, while month by
year fixed effects control for any time-varying factors that are common across
cities. In each specification I also control for differences in city population
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by including indicators for each population decile within the sample.27 Each
specification includes controls for the city-level unemployment rate as well as
an indicator for the presence of light rail transit.28 Finally, some specifica-
tions include detailed NTD data on the size of each city’s bus and rail transit
networks.29
1.5.1 Overall Effects
I first test for the effect of ridesharing by testing for any overall change
in drunk driving and other crime outcomes after the introduction of these
services. I use Equation 1 below to perform this estimation.
yi,t = α0 + βRSi,t +Xi,tγ + δi + φt + εi,t (1.1)
yi,t represents the outcome of interest. RSi,t is an indicator for whether one
or more ridesharing services were operating in city i at time t. Xi,t represents
a vector of covariates about the city such as public transportation availability,
population, and unemployment rate. δi are the city fixed effects. φt are the
month by year fixed effects. The effect of ridesharing’s presence on outcomes
in this model is captured by the time-invariant coefficient β.
27To do this I calculate population deciles for the sample each year and assign each city
to its corresponding decile. Using quadratic population controls instead does not change
any of the results.
28I do not include an indicator for the presence of heavy rail transit because there is
no variation in heavy rail transit availability over the sample period so any effect of these
services will be captured by the city fixed effects.
29I do not include these data in every specification because they are only present for 69%
of the sample cities.
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1.5.2 Time-Varying Effects
It is possible that any effects ridesharing has on drunk driving and
other crime rates may change with the duration of time the services have
been present. Accordingly, the econometric model I use to test for this allows
the coefficient on the treatment variable to vary with the number of months
since ridesharing introduction. Equation 2 provides the estimation equation
for testing this.
yi,t = α0 +
G∑
g=1
ρgRSi,t,g +Xi,tγ + δi + φt + εi,t (1.2)
Again, yi,t represents the outcome of interest, Xi,t is a vector of covariates, δi
are the city fixed effects, and φt are the month by year fixed effects. RSi,t,g are
a set of dummy variables which equal one if one or more ridesharing services
are present in city i at time t and whose duration of operation in that city falls
into group g. The operating time groups I use are 0-6 months, 6-12 months,
12-18 months, 18-24 months, and 24 months or more.30 I also include groups
for each six month period prior to introduction, excluding the one immediately
before ridesharing’s launch. These groups are more than 24 months prior, 24-
18 months prior, 18-12 months prior, and 12-6 months prior. The coefficients
ρg represent the the effect of ridesharing for each operating duration group.
30Each group is exclusive of the lower bound and inclusive of the upper bound.
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1.5.3 Identification
The difference-in-differences will identify the causal effect of rideshar-
ing if the treatment and control groups would have followed parallel trends
but for the treatment. The gradual expansion of ridesharing services to cities
across the U.S. means the treatment group represents an expanding propor-
tion of U.S. cities, covering 80% of cities with 100,000 people or more by the
end of 2014. This also means that the control group changes over time as
well, representing all cities where ridesharing services have yet to launch as
of each particular month. To assess whether the two groups followed similar
trends prior to ridesharing introduction, I focus on cities in which ridesharing
launched between 2012 and 2014 and compare them to those in which rideshar-
ing launched in 2015 and later (or have yet to launch). Together, these two
groups represent over 94% of the sample cities.31 Figure 2 presents the aver-
age annual fatal alcohol-related auto accidents for each of the two groups from
2000 through 2011, representing all or most of the pre-ridesharing period for
each of the cities.32 The pre-introduction trends for the two groups closely
track one another, making plausible the assumption that absent ridesharing’s
launch they would have continued to do so. Figure 3 presents the same infor-
mation for DUI arrests. In this graph the two groups differ in the first few
years of the sample but then begin moving together. Importantly, the graph
31Restricting the analysis to this subsample does not change the results.
32Fatal accidents in 2000 are significantly lower than in subsequent years. Omitting
observations from 2000 does not change the results.
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Figure 1.2: Fatal Accident Pre-Ridesharing Trend Comparison
shows that DUI arrests in early-adoption cities were not declining relative to
later-adoption cities prior to ridesharing’s introduction.
Another method for testing for identification in difference-in-differences
settings is to conduct an “event study” analysis. This method is similar to
the technique I describe in the previous section for examining the time-varying
effects of ridesharing. The key difference is that instead of only testing the
effect of ridesharing in each six-month period post-introduction it also tests
for effects in each six-month period pre-introduction. If the identification
strategy is correct there should be little to no effect of these pre-introduction
periods. Figures 4 and 5 present the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence
intervals for this event study analysis for fatal alcohol-related auto accidents
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Figure 1.3: DUI Arrests Pre-Ridesharing Trend Comparison
and DUI arrests, respectively. Each shows the estimated effect of ridesharing
for each of the four pre-introduction periods prior to the period just before
ridesharing introduction (indicated by time period zero) as well as the four
six-month periods following introduction. For each drunk driving outcome
there is a slight downward trend in the pre-introduction periods followed a
substantial reduction in drunk driving outcomes post-introduction. Most of
the pre-introduction coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero,
providing support for my identification of the effects of ridesharing on drunk
driving.
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Figure 1.4: Fatal Alcohol-Related Accidents Before and After Ridesharing
Introduction
25
Figure 1.5: DUI Arrests Before and After Ridesharing Introduction
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1.6 Results
1.6.1 Fatal Alcohol-Related Auto Accidents and DUI Arrests
I begin my analysis by examining the effect of ridesharing services on
fatal alcohol-related auto accidents and DUI arrests. I first test for an overall
effect after ridesharing introduction. It is possible that this overall effect ex-
hibits heterogeneity depending on the length of time these services have been
operating, so I also test for differential effects of ridesharing based on dura-
tion of operation. The fatal accident and DUI arrest data represent monthly
counts of the number of accidents or arrests in each city. Accordingly, any
effect of ridesharing is best estimated using a count model such as Poisson
or Negative Binomial. In my estimates I use the Negative Binomial model
because it relaxes the Poisson model assumption of equal mean and variance
of the dependent variable. For reference I include OLS estimates as well.
1.6.1.1 Overall Drunk Driving Results
To estimate the effect of ridesharing services on fatal alcohol-related
auto accidents and DUI arrests I begin by testing for an overall change in the
frequency of such outcomes after ridesharing services enter a city. I estimate
Equation 1 using drunk driving data for all cities with populations of 100,000 or
more covering the period from 2000 through 2014. Specification (1) in Table 2
uses OLS to estimate the effect of ridesharing on the natural log of the monthly
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number of fatal accidents.33 The coefficient on ridesharing in specification
(1) indicates a significant reduction in fatal accidents following ridesharing
introduction.34 Because fatal accidents are discrete count data, specification
(2) in Table 2 estimates Equation 1 using a Negative Binomial count model.
Using this specification I estimate that ridesharing reduces fatal alcohol-related
auto accidents by 10%.35 Specification (3) estimates the same model but adds
in additional public transportation covariates measuring the size of each city’s
public transit system. I incorporate data on the directional route miles for all
rail transit excluding commuter trains, the directional route miles for all bus
transit excluding commuter buses, and the directional route miles for buses
with exclusive right-of-way. I exclude commuter trains and buses because they
operate primarily during weekday rush hours and are of limited use outside of
commuting to and from work. These additional transit data are not available
for every city in the original sample so the number of cities included declines
from 273 to 189 for specification (3).36 The inclusion of these additional control
33Following Greenwood and Wattal (2015) I add one to each monthly fatal accident ob-
servation to account for the fact that observations with zero accidents are undefined in log
form absent this modification. DUI arrests do not have this issue. Because the estimated
effects on fatal accidents are negative, this modification will understate the true reduction
due to ridesharing.
34The coefficient of -0.049 indicates that ridesharing reduces the mean of log fatal accidents
by 0.049, which corresponds to a percentage reduction of 4.8%. Due to the modification
described in the previous footnote, this estimate understates the true magnitude of the
reduction in fatal accidents.
35The coefficients for Negative Binomial regressions represent the change in the mean of
the natural logs for the outcome variable in response to a unit change in the independent
variable. Accordingly, the percentage change is calculated as exp(coefficient)− 1.
36Redoing the estimation in specification (2) with the sample restricted to that in speci-
fication (3) yields an estimated coefficient on the ridesharing variable of -.114 (p<0.001).
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variables does not substantively change the estimated impact of ridesharing,
with the magnitude of the estimated effect for specification (3) rising slightly
to a 11.4% reduction in fatal accidents. Specifications (4), (5), and (6) perform
the same estimations as the first three specifications using DUI arrests as the
dependent variable. The first two DUI specifications indicate little effect of
ridesharing on the number of DUI arrests. Adding detailed public transit data
in specification (6) results in a marginally significant but substantial 6.9%
reduction in DUI arrests following ridesharing’s introduction. This result is
driven largely by the change in sample composition in specification (6) due to
the detailed transit data availability. Restricting specifications (4) and (5) to
the same sample yields estimated reductions in DUI arrests due to ridesharing
of 8.1% to 11.0% (p<0.05).
The number of fatal alcohol-related accidents increases sharply during
nighttime hours on weekends.37 For the cities in my sample, 45% of all fatal
alcohol-related accidents occur during these time periods. It is possible that
the effect of ridesharing services will differ for these higher-risk time periods,
when more people are going out to bars and restaurants. It is unclear, a
priori, whether the effect during this time period will be higher or lower than
the overall effect. While weekend nighttime hours are when the bulk of drunk
driving fatalities occur, they are also more likely to be periods of high demand
for ridesharing services, which can trigger surge pricing and reduce the appeal
37Weekend nighttime hours are between 5pm and 4am on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sun-
days.
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Table 1.2: Overall Effect on Drunk Driving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Rideshare -0.049∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.021 0.002 -0.071+
(0.015) (0.028) (0.034) (0.044) (0.038) (0.042)
Unemp. Rate -0.022∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.012 0.014+ 0.010
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Light Rail -0.059 -0.137∗ -0.136∗ -0.050 -0.010 0.087
(0.047) (0.070) (0.064) (0.122) (0.110) (0.106)
Rail Miles 0.013 -0.204
(0.041) (0.175)
Bus Miles -0.005∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.005)
Excl. Bus Miles -0.141∗ 0.047
(0.066) (0.083)
City FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Month x Year FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Population Decile
√ √ √ √ √ √
Estimation OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
N 49130 49130 30666 39372 39372 24774
R2 0.485 0.172 0.169 0.479 0.204 0.209
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Rail and bus miles are in units of 100 directional route miles.
Transit mileage and DUI arrest data are not available for all sample cities in all months.
“Excl.” refers to exclusive right-of-way.
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of ridesharing as a transportation alternative.38 To test how the effect of
ridesharing differs I repeat the analysis above using only accidents that occur
within this time frame. The results, presented in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3
are similar to those using all alcohol-related fatal accidents. This suggests that
there is not a significantly different effect on fatal accidents during weekend
nighttime hours. It also mitigates the concern that the potential for surge
pricing during high-demand times might reduce ridesharing’s impact during
these periods.
For DUI arrests it is not possible to focus on certain time periods as I
did with the fatal accident data. These data are aggregated to the monthly
level and do not include any time-of-day arrest information. These data do,
however contain arrest totals by gender and age range. This allows me to hone
in on another potentially higher-risk subset of data, males aged 21 to 44.39 It
is possible that this high risk group would be more affected by ridesharing
since they more frequently drive drunk. It is also possible that this group
would be less affected by the presence of ridesharing as they already have a
higher-than-average observed preference for drunk driving. Columns (4)-(6)
of Table 3 presents the results of estimating the overall effect models on this
subset of DUI arrest data. The point estimates are similar to the overall DUI
38”Surge pricing” is a term coined by Uber. When demand for rides exceeds supply Uber
and Lyft increase prices to better equalize demand and supply.
39In 2014 Males were responsible for 80.4% of fatal drunk driving accidents
and drivers aged 21-44 were responsible for 60% of such accidents. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “Traffic Safety Facts, 2014 Data” Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Dec. 2015, DOT HS 812 231.
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812231.
31
arrest results, implying that ridesharing does not have a substantively different
effect on drunk driving arrests for males aged 21-44 than it does for all drivers.
1.6.1.2 Time-Varying Drunk Driving Results
It is possible that ridesharing service in a city requires time to reach full
scale after launch. Hall and Krueger (2015) provide evidence for this, showing
that the number of active ridesharing drivers increases significantly with the
duration of ridesharing’s presence, particularly for early-adoption cities. This
may mean that during the start up period the effect on drunk driving is lower
than it is once the service has established a network of drivers and riders. To
test this I estimate Equation 2 using the same OLS and Negative Binomial
models as I used to measure the overall ridesharing effect. I separately esti-
mate the effect of ridesharing services for each six-month period prior to and
following their launch.40 The results are presented in Table 4. Specifications
(2) and (3) provide some support for this hypothesis for fatal alcohol-related
accidents. In each the point estimates of the effect of ridesharing are larger
after the first year of service availability. The estimated effects of ridesharing
in the last half of the second year of operation are significantly larger than
those within the first year.41 The time-varying results for ridesharing’s effect
on DUI arrests follow the overall results. There is some evidence of an effect
once detailed transit data are included in column (6) but they are imprecisely
40After two years of ridesharing operation all observations are grouped into a single ”> 24”
months category and before 24 months prior are grouped into ”< −24”.
41All other ridesharing coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from one another.
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Table 1.3: Effect on Drunk Driving at High-Risk Times and for High-Risk
Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Rideshare -0.032∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.011 0.005 -0.064
(0.013) (0.039) (0.046) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043)
Unemp. Rate -0.014∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ 0.007 0.009 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Light Rail -0.048 -0.163∗∗ -0.148∗∗ -0.033 0.009 0.087
(0.032) (0.058) (0.055) (0.114) (0.108) (0.106)
Rail Miles 0.034 -0.238
(0.042) (0.173)
Bus Miles -0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.005)
Excl. Bus Miles -0.139∗ 0.032
(0.061) (0.082)
City FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Month x Year FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Population Decile
√ √ √ √ √ √
Estimation OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
N 49130 49130 30666 39372 39372 24774
R2 0.426 0.147 0.145 0.460 0.217 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Rail and bus miles are in units of 100 directional route miles.
Transit mileage data are not available for all sample cities in all months.
High-risk times for fatal accidents are between 5pm and 4am Friday through Sunday.
High-risk groups for DUI arrests are males aged 21-44.
“Excl.” refers to exclusive right-of-way.
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estimated. There is little evidence that ridesharing has a substantially larger
effect on DUI arrests the longer the services have been operating. Equality
between all of the DUI arrest ridesharing coefficients cannot be rejected for
any of the specifications.
As with the overall results, I repeat the above analysis restricting my
attention to fatal alcohol-related accidents which occur on weekend nighttime
hours which are high-risk times for drunk driving. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5
present the results. The pattern seen in the time-varying results for all fatal
alcohol-related accidents is present in the weekend nighttime results as well.
The estimates of the effects of ridesharing are higher after the services have
been operating for at least a year than within the first year of operation. All
of the coefficients for ridesharing’s effect after 18 months of operation are sig-
nificantly larger than those for the first year. As with the overall fatal accident
results the estimated effect of ridesharing is somewhat larger for weekend night-
time crashes than it is for all fatal alcohol-related accidents. I also estimate
the time-varying effects of ridesharing on DUI arrests for males aged 21-44.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 present these estimates. As with the estimates
for all DUI arrests, there is no evidence of a differing effect of ridesharing on
DUI arrests for this high-risk group the longer ridesharing services have been
operating.
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Table 1.4: Time-Varying Effect on Drunk Driving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Rideshare Tenure
< −24 Months 0.057∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.023 -0.012 0.040
(0.022) (0.042) (0.051) (0.054) (0.046) (0.063)
-24 - -18 Months -0.012 0.023 -0.090∗ -0.001 -0.038 -0.003
(0.022) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.033) (0.043)
-18 - -12 Months 0.042∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.024 -0.016 -0.032 -0.012
(0.019) (0.033) (0.051) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032)
-12 - -6 Months -0.004 0.0002 -0.029 -0.004 -0.029 0.0004
(0.018) (0.032) (0.037) (0.028) (0.019) (0.023)
0 - 6 Months -0.031 -0.045 -0.056 -0.047 -0.024 -0.063∗
(0.019) (0.036) (0.042) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
6 - 12 Months -0.023 -0.043 -0.080+ 0.011 -0.003 -0.060
(0.023) (0.039) (0.047) (0.038) (0.032) (0.044)
12 - 18 Months -0.037 -0.077 -0.132∗ -0.015 -0.040 -0.102+
(0.025) (0.050) (0.065) (0.049) (0.042) (0.057)
18 - 24 Months -0.089∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ 0.013 0.014 -0.083
(0.032) (0.058) (0.071) (0.083) (0.059) (0.066)
> 24 Months -0.027 -0.106+ -0.146+ -0.034 -0.014 -0.030
(0.030) (0.060) (0.076) (0.086) (0.073) (0.078)
Transit Detail
√ √
Estimation OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
N 49130 49130 30666 39372 39372 24774
All specifications include population decile and city and month by year fixed effects.
All specifications control for light rail and unemployment rate.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
Rideshare tenure ranges are exclusive of the first number and inclusive of the second.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 1.5: Time-Varying Effect on Drunk Driving for High-Risk Times and
Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Rideshare Tenure
< −24 Months 0.036∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.033 -0.002 0.038
(0.056) (0.042) (0.070) (0.051) (0.047) (0.063)
-24 - -18 Months -0.001 0.035 0.056 -0.007 -0.033 -0.002
(0.018) (0.057) (0.071) (0.036) (0.034) (0.043)
-18 - -12 Months 0.025 0.090+ -0.017 -0.048 -0.027 -0.006
(0.017) (0.049) (0.057) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033)
-12 - -6 Months -0.002 -0.013 -0.062 -0.005 -0.023 0.007
(0.016) (0.049) (0.056) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025)
0 - 6 Months -0.020 -0.052 -0.059 -0.037 -0.018 -0.052+
(0.016) (0.052) (0.059) (0.027) (0.023) (0.030)
6 - 12 Months -0.001 -0.008 -0.054 0.016 0.005 -0.053
(0.021) (0.059) (0.069) (0.036) (0.033) (0.044)
12 - 18 Months -0.019 -0.086 -0.218∗∗ -0.013 -0.035 -0.098+
(0.021) (0.064) (0.080) (0.048) (0.045) (0.058)
18 - 24 Months -0.075∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ 0.035 0.029 -0.077
(0.026) (0.085) (0.097) (0.073) (0.063) (0.067)
> 24 Months -0.054+ -0.238∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.001 0.004 -0.012
(0.028) (0.081) (0.088) (0.078) (0.073) (0.077)
Transit Detail
√ √
Estimation OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
N 49130 49130 30666 39372 39372 24774
All specifications include population decile and city and month by year fixed effects.
All specifications control for light rail and unemployment rate.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
High-risk times for fatal accidents are between 5pm and 4am Friday through Sunday.
High-risk groups for DUI arrests are males aged 21-44.
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1.6.1.3 Heterogeneity by Public Transit Quality
The previous sections estimated the effects of ridesharing across all
cities with populations of 100,000 or greater. It is possible that the effect of
introducing a new form of transportation will differ depending on the existing
stock of transportation options. The cities in the sample vary widely in their
public transit systems, ranging from immense subway systems in cities like
New York to simple municipal bus systems. To test whether the effects of
ridesharing on drunk driving outcomes differ for cities with extensive transit
systems versus those without I separate out the top ten cities in terms of
transit usage from the rest of the sample and estimate the effect of ridesharing
separately for each.42 Using alternative measures of high transit usage does
not change the results.43 I focus on transit usage rather than measures of
transit system size to capture differences in city residents’ observed preference
for public transit. I estimate the effects of ridesharing separately for the two
groups using Equation 3 below.
yi,t = α0 + β1RSi,t + β2(RSi,t × TopTeni) + γXi,t + δi + φt + εi,t (1.3)
In this estimation, the coefficient β1 captures the effect of ridesharing
42Top ten transit usage cities are in terms of 2011 total unlinked passenger trips as reported
in the 2013 American Public Transportation Association Factbook using data from the
National Transit Database. These top ten cities represent over 75% of all 2011 unlinked
passenger trips reported for 2011.
43I find similar results using the top 5, top 20, and top 30 cities in terms of transit usage.
I also find the same results using per-capita usage instead of absolute number of trips.
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on cities outside the top ten transit cities while β1 + β2 represents the effect
for cities in the top ten of transit usage. The coefficient β2 estimates how the
effect of ridesharing differs for cities with high transit usage. Table 6 presents
the results of this estimation for both fatal alcohol-related accidents and DUI
arrests. Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate that the effect of ridesharing on
fatal accidents is consistent across cities regardless of transit quality. Columns
(3) and (4), however provide evidence that the effect of ridesharing on DUI
arrests does vary for high transit usage cities. When all cities are combined
the estimated effect was only marginally significant, and only for some speci-
fications. The results in Table 6 show that there is a significant reduction in
DUI arrests for low transit usage cities of between 8.7% and 9.2%. Adding the
two ridesharing coefficients β1 and β2 gives an estimated effect on DUI arrests
for high transit use cities of close to zero. The differing effects of ridesharing
on DUI arrests for the two groups of cities compared to the consistent effects
for fatal accidents is an interesting result. One potential explanation is that
in cities with high transit use, which are also large cities, the number of drunk
drivers exceeds the police’s capacity to detect and arrest them. If this discrep-
ancy is large enough, even if there is a reduction in the total number of drunk
drivers on the road, the number of arrests could remain steady as there are
still more drunk drivers on the road than the police are able to arrest. Further
research into such heterogeneity could provide insights into whether estimates
of the effectiveness of drunk driving prevention strategies are accurate when
using DUI arrests as their measure of drunk driving prevalence.
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Table 1.6: Overall Ridesharing Effect by Transit Usage
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Fatal Crashes Fatal Crashes DUI Arrests DUI Arrests
Rideshare -0.112∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.097∗ -0.091∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.045) (0.046)
Rideshare × High Transit -0.022 0.009 0.089 0.093
(0.053) (0.056) (0.068) (0.072)
Unemp. Rate -0.040∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.011 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Light Rail -0.204∗∗ -0.135∗ 0.104 0.098
(0.072) (0.064) (0.105) (0.107)
Rail Miles 0.013 -0.208
(0.041) (0.172)
Bus Miles -0.005∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.005)
Excl. Bus Miles -0.142∗ 0.044
(0.066) (0.084)
City FE
√ √ √ √
Month x Year FE
√ √ √ √
Population Decile
√ √ √ √
N 32750 30366 26487 24535
R2 0.170 0.168 0.207 0.208
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
All models estimated using a negative binomial specification.
Cities in top 10 by 2011 NTD unlinked passenger trips are “High Transit Use”.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Rail and bus miles are in units of 100 directional route miles.
“Excl.” refers to exclusive right-of-way.
39
1.6.2 Ridesharing and Other Crimes
The previous sections have focused on ridesharing’s impact on drunk
driving. Any effect of ridesharing on drunk driving should be to reduce its
incidence, which is what I find. However, drunk driving is not the only outcome
that can be affected by the presence of ridesharing services. One significant
concern around ridesharing services has been the potential for sexual assaults
perpetrated by insufficiently vetted drivers. The common argument is that the
lack of the type of fingerprint-based background checks that chauffeurs and
taxi drivers receive increases the risk of assault to passengers. Such concerns
have led cities such as Austin and Houston to require fingerprint-background
checks for ridesharing drivers. In the case of Austin this regulation resulted in
Uber and Lyft shutting down service in the city.
In addition to potential assaults committed by drivers, ridesharing has
the potential to affect other types of crime by possibly increasing the amount
of alcohol consumption or inducing more people to drink outside the home. A
high proportion of perpetrators of crimes such as physical and sexual assault
had recently consumed alcohol prior to commission of the crime (Greenfeld
(1998)). Increasing the number of intoxicated people in public might then
result in an increase in assaults and other potentially alcohol-related crimes.
Conversely, ridesharing services might make it easier for people to quickly get
home after consuming alcohol without the need to rely on potentially more
hazardous means such as walking, waiting for public transit, or accepting
rides from acquaintances. This could lower their risk of becoming the victim
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of physical or sexual assault. A priori, the net effect ridesharing will have
on these types of crimes is unclear. It is important to estimate these effects
to determine whether the benefits of a reduction in drunk driving due to
ridesharing is mitigated by increases in other crimes or bolstered by decreases
in them.
1.6.2.1 Overall Other Crime Results
As with the drunk driving analyses I begin by testing for overall effects
of ridesharing’s introduction. To test this I use Uniform Crime Report data to
estimate whether ridesharing had any effect on arrests for these types of crimes.
Table 7 presents the results. Rather than increasing the number of physical
and sexual assaults, ridesharing is a associated with a 7.9% and 9.3% reduction
in each, respectively. Ridesharing has no effect on arrests for drunkenness or
liquor law violations, two other measures that could potentially be affected
by greater alcohol consumption. As a check to ensure these estimates are not
being driven by some unobserved factors affecting arrest rates or crime rates
generally44 I also test for an effect of ridesharing on embezzlement arrests which
should be unrelated to both ridesharing’s presence and the amount of alcohol
consumption. Consistent with the prediction that embezzlement should be
unrelated to ridesharing the coefficient is close to zero and not significant.
Contrary to the concerns of municipal authorities, these estimates in-
dicate that ridesharing results in significant reductions in arrests for physical
44Which are coincident with the introduction of ridesharing services.
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Table 1.7: Ridesharing’s Effect on Other Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sexual Physical Drunkenness Liquor Law Embezzlement
Assault Assault Violations
Rideshare -0.098∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.009 0.047 0.011
(0.046) (0.025) (0.067) (0.070) (0.053)
Unemp. Rate -0.026 -0.014∗ 0.029∗ -0.028∗ 0.017
(0.019) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
City FE
√ √ √ √ √
Month x Year FE
√ √ √ √ √
Population Decile
√ √ √ √ √
Light Rail Dummy
√ √ √ √ √
N 22332 40378 24065 34454 16885
R2 0.252 0.228 0.193 0.189 0.196
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications estimated using the Negative Binomial model.
Arrest data are not available for all sample cities in all months.
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and sexual assault and has no effect on arrests for other alcohol-related crimes.
More research could help hone in on the potential mechanisms of this reduction
in physical and sexual assaults after ridesharing introduction. These results
alleviate concerns that ridesharing might result in higher rates of sexual as-
sault and alcohol-related crime and potentially highlight another social benefit
of ridesharing availability.
1.6.2.2 Time-Varying Other Crime Results
Given the significant overall effects of ridesharing on arrests for physical
and sexual assaults it can be useful to examine whether these results exhibit
any heterogeneity with the duration of ridesharing operation. As with the
drunk driving estimates, I test this by estimating Equation 2 using arrests for
each of the potentially alcohol-related crimes as the dependent variable. Table
8 presents the results of estimating the effect of ridesharing on each type of
crime separately for each six-month period after introduction.
The estimates for physical and sexual assaults exhibit the same pattern
as fatal alcohol-related auto accidents, with the effect of ridesharing appearing
to increase the longer the services have been operating. By the third year of
operation, the reductions in both types of assaults are two to three times larger
than the initial reduction. This is consistent with the idea that as ridesharing
services become more established and expand their base of riders and drivers,
the impact they have on alcohol-related crime should increase. It should be
noted that the coefficients on the pre-ridesharing periods are positive and
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Table 1.8: Time-Varying Effect on Other Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sexual Physical Drunkenness Liquor Law Embezzlement
Assault Assault Violations
Rideshare Tenure
< −24 Months 0.129∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.098 0.027 0.058
(0.048) (0.027) (0.064) (0.079) (0.090)
-24 - -18 Months 0.072∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.083 0.020 -0.009
(0.035) (0.018) (0.051) (0.061) (0.062)
-18 - -12 Months 0.061∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.042 0.023 -0.015
(0.032) (0.016) (0.037) (0.051) (0.048)
-12 - -6 Months 0.040 0.034∗∗ 0.001 -0.009 0.032
(0.028) (0.012) (0.026) (0.045) (0.042)
0 - 6 Months -0.024 -0.028∗ 0.013 0.041 -0.025
(0.034) (0.013) (0.032) (0.053) (0.048)
6 - 12 Months -0.013 -0.028 -0.030 0.058 0.101
(0.050) (0.021) (0.055) (0.098) (0.075)
12 - 18 Months -0.126∗ -0.037 0.008 0.092 -0.004
(0.063) (0.029) (0.080) (0.097) (0.070)
18 - 24 Months -0.117 -0.068+ 0.028 0.042 0.031
(0.072) (0.035) (0.111) (0.100) (0.080)
> 24 Months -0.192+ -0.145∗∗ 0.215 0.015 0.023
(0.099) (0.052) (0.232) (0.147) (0.085)
N 22332 40378 24065 34454 16885
All specifications include population decile and city and month by year fixed effects.
All specifications control for light rail and unemployment rate.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications estimated using the Negative Binomial model.
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significant, this could indicate that the estimated reductions after ridesharing’s
introduction are driven by unaccounted for pre-existing trends.
1.7 Robustness
1.7.1 Placebo Test
One method for testing the validity of my estimated effects is to con-
duct a placebo test. To do so I randomly assign month-city pairs a placebo
”treatment” indicator. Each of the 222 true ridesharing launches occur be-
tween May 2010 and December 2014 so my random assignment selects 222
cities from the sample and then randomly selects a ”treatment” month for
each from within this time frame. I repeat this process 1,000 times to create
my placebo samples. Using each of these I estimate the effect the ”treatment”
has on fatal alcohol-related auto accidents. Figure 6 presents a CDF of the
estimated coefficients on the ridesharing placebo treatment variable. The red
vertical line represents the true estimated coefficient of -0.105 using the actual
ridesharing launch dates. Not only is the true coefficient strongly significant
(p<0.001), it is a full standard deviation larger in magnitude than the largest
of the estimated placebo coefficients. This provides support that the estimated
effect of ridesharing on fatal alcohol-related accidents is not due to chance.
1.7.2 Non-Alcohol Related Fatal Accidents
If the presence of ridesharing induces some people to use these services
rather than drive drunk we should expect to see a drop in fatal alcohol-related
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Figure 1.6: Placebo Test Results
accidents after introduction of these services, which is precisely what my results
show. One potential concern is that the introduction of ridesharing might
be coincident with other unobserved factors affecting traffic safety such as
roadway improvements, higher public transit usage, increased preference for
safer automobiles, etc. Most of these factors are likely to affect not only
the incidence of alcohol-related fatal accidents but non-alcohol related ones
as well. To test whether my results are being driven by unobserved factors
such as these I estimate whether ridesharing has had any effect on non-alcohol
related accidents. The results from these regressions are presented in Table
9. In each model the coefficient on ridesharing is close to zero and highly
insignificant. These results provide support that the effects on alcohol-related
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fatal accidents are not being driven by coincidental unobserved improvements
in traffic safety.
1.7.3 Low-Cost Ridesharing
Not all ridesharing services are alike. When Uber initially launched
in 2010 they only offered higher-end black car services. While possessing the
convenience of other app-based ridesharing services, this ”Uber Black” service
was substantially more costly and typically cost more than a standard taxi.
Services like Lyft and Uber’s Uber X provide the same convenience but at
a substantially lower cost. These services did not begin until 2012. It is
possible that the effect of Uber X and Lyft on drunk driving differs from that
of the higher-cost Uber Black. My earlier analyses all use the initial date
of ridesharing availability as the treatment variable. In 29% of my sample
of ridesharing cities, these low-cost options launched after Uber Black was
already operating. For these cities, the low-cost option launched on average
one year after Uber Black began service.45 Table 10 presents the overall effect
of ridesharing on drunk driving separating out the effect of the higher-cost Uber
Black from the lower-cost services. The coefficients on each type of ridesharing
service are statistically indistinguishable and are consistent with my earlier
estimates of the effect of any ridesharing presence. This consistency suggests
that the increased convenience of ridesharing might induce some would-be
45This gap varies widely, ranging from 23 days after Uber Black’s launch to almost three
years after.
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Table 1.9: Ridesharing’s Effect on Non-Alcohol Related Crashes
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
Rideshare -0.005 -0.012 -0.003
(0.015) (0.021) (0.026)
Unemployment Rate -0.008∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)




Bus Miles (Total) -0.003
(0.002)








N 49130 49130 30666
R2 0.551 0.195 0.192
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Rail and bus miles are in units of 100 directional route miles.
Transit mileage data are not available for all sample cities in all months.
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drunk drivers to substitute to these services even when the cost is higher than
the low-cost Lyft and Uber X options.
1.7.4 Constant Sample
The completeness of the data for the different outcomes and covariates
varies. This causes the sample composition to differ across regression speci-
fications as different outcomes are used and different covariates are included.
To allow for more direct comparison of the effect of ridesharing in the vari-
ous models I restrict the data to a constant subset which contains all of the
variables needed for each model. Table 11 presents the results. The estimated
effects of ridesharing on fatal alcohol-related accidents are similar to the results
using the full, unrestricted sample. For DUI arrests, I now estimate a signif-
icant reduction of 6.9% to 11.0% after ridesharing’s introduction. Previously
I found a marginally significant reduction in DUIs only in the specification
which included the detailed transit data. This reduction appears to be driven
by the reduced sample for which these data are available rather than through
increased precision gained by controlling for the transit measures. When using
this restricted sample without the detailed transit controls I also find large and
significant reductions in DUI arrests due to ridesharing’s introduction.
1.8 Discussion
In order to interpret the results presented in this study it is important
to put them in context of other drunk driving prevention methods. Shults et al
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Table 1.10: Overall Effect on Drunk Driving - Low-Cost Services Separate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Low-Cost Rideshare -0.047∗∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.102∗ -0.034 -0.014 -0.090+
(0.018) (0.033) (0.040) (0.052) (0.043) (0.049)
Uber Black Only -0.052∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗ -0.002 0.024 -0.033
(0.021) (0.039) (0.051) (0.048) (0.041) (0.045)
Unemp. Rate -0.022∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.012 0.014+ 0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Light Rail -0.059 -0.137∗ -0.137∗ -0.050 -0.010 0.087
(0.047) (0.070) (0.064) (0.122) (0.110) (0.106)
Rail Miles 0.013 -0.207
(0.041) (0.175)
Bus Miles -0.005∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.005)
Excl. Bus Miles -0.141∗ 0.048
(0.066) (0.082)
Estimation OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
N 49130 49130 30666 39372 39372 24774
R2 0.485 0.172 0.169 0.479 0.204 0.209
All specifications include population decile and city and month by year fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Rail and bus miles are in units of 100 directional route miles.
Transit mileage and DUI arrest data are not available for all sample cities in all months.
Low-cost rideshare options include Lyft, UberX, and Sidecar.
“Excl.” refers to exclusive right-of-way.
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Table 1.11: Overall Effect on Drunk Driving - Constant Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Rideshare -0.079∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.117∗ -0.084∗ -0.071+
(0.023) (0.041) (0.040) (0.052) (0.043) (0.042)
Unemp. Rate -0.024∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ 0.009 0.010 0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Light Rail -0.153+ -0.202∗ -0.028 0.106 0.098 0.087
(0.091) (0.089) (0.081) (0.119) (0.111) (0.106)
Rail Miles -0.481∗ -0.204
(0.193) (0.175)
Bus Miles -0.007 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Excl. Bus Miles -0.152∗ 0.047
(0.067) (0.083)
Estimation OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin. OLS Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
N 24774 24774 24774 24774 24774 24774
R2 0.492 0.167 0.168 0.476 0.208 0.209
All specifications include population decile and city and month by year fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Rail and bus miles are in units of 100 directional route miles.
Sample restricted to city-month pairs present in UCR and NTD data.
“Excl.” refers to exclusive right-of-way.
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(2001) provides a thorough review of the estimated effects of various factors on
alcohol-related fatal accidents. They report that laws aimed at curbing alcohol
consumption and increasing the legal risk associated with drinking and driving
are effective at reducing fatal accidents. Reducing the legal blood alcohol
limit (BAC) to 0.08 resulted in a 7% decline in fatal alcohol-related accidents.
Raising the legal drinking age from 18 to 21 reduced fatal accidents among
18-20 year olds by 12%. Increasing the risk of detection for drunk drivers
by instituting random sobriety checkpoints reduces fatal accidents by 22%.
Placing my estimates of the effect of ridesharing in this context, the estimated
10% reduction means introducing ridesharing can be as effective at reducing
fatal alcohol-related accidents as lower BAC limits and higher drinking ages.
Ridesharing is only half as effective as random sobriety checkpoints, but the
reductions due to ridesharing come at little to no public cost whereas the
checkpoints require potentially substantial public funds to operate.
It is possible to use the estimated reduction in fatal accidents due to
ridesharing to construct counterfactuals for what fatal accidents would have
been had ridesharing been more or less prevalent. Figure 7 presents the annual
number of fatal accidents in the sample cities under two alternative scenarios.
The top line represents the level of fatal accidents absent ridesharing entirely.
The central line presents the true number of fatal accidents. The gap between
the two grows over time as ridesharing services enter more and more cities.
The bottom line presents the opposite extreme. This line shows what fatal
accidents would have been had ridesharing been present since 2010 in every
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Figure 1.7: Counter-Factual Fatal Accidents
sample city. Using these, I estimate that ridesharing’s presence has resulted in
over 500 fewer fatal accidents since it’s introduction in 2010. This corresponds
to a monetary benefit of over $4.6 billion over five years.46 Were ridesharing to
be present in every sample city this benefit could grow, reducing fatal accidents
by over 450 each year for annual benefit of over $4 billion. These estimated
benefits are solely from reduced fatalities, the total benefit will be higher once
property damage and non-fatal injuries are included.
The reduction in fatal accidents due to ridesharing has grown as these
services have expanded to more and more cities. Figure 8 shows how the aggre-
46This estimate assumes a single fatality per accident uses the Department of Transporta-
tion’s recommended value of a statistical life of $9.1 million.
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gate reduction in the economic cost of drunk driving fatalities increases over
time. It is important to note that the accident-reduction effects of rideshar-
ing’s presence persist as long as the services continue operating, which will also
increase the accumulated economic harm reduction over time. However, as I
presented earlier, the effect of ridesharing may change the longer the services
have been operating. Using the heterogeneous effects I estimated, Figure 9
presents the aggregate reduction in economic harm due to drunk driving fa-
talities accounting for this non-constant effect of ridesharing. I found that the
effect of ridesharing increases with operating duration, accordingly the esti-
mated aggregate harm reduction accounting for this heterogeneity increases to
$4.8 billion by the end of 2014. Since many of the sample cities had rideshar-
ing for one year or less by that date this impact may increase more quickly in
2015 and later.
1.9 Conclusion
Drunk driving is a significant concern in the U.S., resulting in over
11,000 deaths and 360,000 injuries each year. Offering other forms of trans-
portation as alternatives to self-driving may encourage individuals to utilize
those options rather than drive drunk. Ridesharing services such as Lyft and
Uber offer a more convenient and potentially cheaper alternative to traditional
taxis and alleviate the capacity constraints faced by taxis due to municipal
licensing regulations. To test whether ridesharing has indeed reduced drunk
driving I use a difference-in-differences design to estimate the effect of rideshar-
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Figure 1.8: Aggregate Economic Harm Reduction
Figure 1.9: Aggregate Economic Harm Reduction - Heterogeneous Effects
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ing introduction on fatal alcohol-related auto accidents and DUI arrests. Con-
trolling for important co-factors such as unemployment rates and public trans-
portation availability I estimate that ridesharing reduces fatal alcohol-related
auto accidents by 10% to 11.4%. I find that ridesharing reduces DUI arrests
by 8.7% to 9.2% in cities with low to moderate transit usage, but has no effect
in cities where transit usage is very high.
These results provide strong evidence that the presence of ridesharing
services induces a large number of people who would otherwise drive drunk
to take alternative transportation. Contrary to common concerns regarding
ridesharing’s potential to increase incidence of other crimes I find that the
introduction of ridesharing corresponds to substantial reductions in arrests
for sexual and physical assault of 9.3% and 7.9% respectively. These large
estimated benefits suggest that facilitating ridesharing services can be a potent
tool for reducing drunk driving and its associated costs. Promotion of these
benefits of ridesharing services as well as public subsidization could potentially
increase these drunk driving reductions. Further quantitative and qualitative
studies can delve into the exact mechanisms by which ridesharing impacts the
incidence of drunk driving and assault.
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Chapter 2
Quantifying the Effect of Rapid Transit on
Drunk Driving
2.1 Introduction
Rapid public transit systems have the potential to alleviate a number
of negative outcomes, from road congestion and parking availability to air
pollution from automobiles. These systems also have the potential to reduce
the incidence of drunk driving if they provide a convenient alternative to self-
driving for people who plan to consume alcohol. This last effect is important
due to the high prevalence of drunk driving in the United States. Driving under
the influence of alcohol causes over 11,000 deaths and 300,000 injuries in the
U.S. each year. The monetary cost of these accidents ranges from $49 to $200
billion annually. This high cost makes quantifying the effects of rapid transit
on drunk driving rates an essential tool for policymakers tasked with weighing
the costs and benefits of developing or expanding rapid transit systems.
Little research exists looking at the effects of building rapid transit
systems on drunk driving. Jackson and Owens (2011) estimate the impact of
Washington DC extending the operating hours of its subway system in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. They find that while there is no measurable effect
57
on drunk driving deaths or arrests city-wide, they do find localized reductions
in DUI arrests in areas with both a large number of drinking establishments
as well as subway access. In this paper I exploit a more potent source of
potential drunk driving reduction, the presence of rapid transit rather than
just the operating hours.
Most of the research on drunk driving prevention has focused on either
punishment and enforcement or restricting access to alcohol. While these
studies find these strategies effective in some cases (Kenkel (1993)) these types
of policies can carry significant public costs with little external benefit beyond
drunk driving prevention. Rapid transit systems have the potential to reduce
drunk driving while simultaneously providing other important benefits to cities
such as reduced road congestion and lower traffic pollution.
In this paper I use the gradual build out of rapid transit systems in
U.S. cities since the 1970s to identify the causal effect of these systems on
fatal alcohol-related auto accidents and DUI/DWI arrests. I gathered data on
every line and station opening for sixteen U.S. cities with rapid transit systems
(heavy rail, light rail, and/or rapid buses) and combined that with data on
all fatal alcohol-related auto accidents and drunk driving arrests from 1975
through 2014.1 This sample includes all cities with heavy rail (i.e. subways)
and a selection of cities with only light rail and rapid bus transit. These non-
1The sixteen cities are: Washington DC, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Boston, Atlanta, Miami, Baltimore, Cleveland, San Francisco, Denver, Houston, Buffalo,
Charlotte, and Dallas.
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heavy rail cities were selected because they developed their systems during
the sample period. Using a fixed effects difference-in-differences methodology
I find that adding an additional rapid transit line reduces fatal drunk driving
accidents by 11.5% to 13.2%. Alternatively, I find that adding an additional
station reduces fatal accidents by 1% to 1.2%. For DUI/DWI arrests I find
similar reductions of 12.7% to 14.4% in fatal alcohol-related accident for each
additional rapid transit line and alternatively a 1.4% to 1.8% reduction per
additional rapid transit station. Density and interconnectedness of rapid tran-
sit systems, measured by the number of stations per line and the number of
connections between lines, have little effect on either drunk driving outcome.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides
background on the use of rapid transit systems in the U.S. as well as the
problem of drunk driving. Section 3 provides an analytical framework for the
decision process behind drunk driving and the potential effects of rapid transit.
Section 4 describes the data sources I use. Section 5 presents the empirical
methodology. Section 6 presents the results of my analysis. Section 7 tests the
robustness of these estimates. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Rapid Transit in the United States
The development of rapid transit systems in the United States varied
substantially from city to city. Early adopters such as New York City and
Chicago developed their systems in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with
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the systems remaining largely fixed since then.2 Rapid transit systems consist
of some combination of heavy rail (subways and elevated trains), light rail
(smaller, slower trains which sometimes share roadways with cars), streetcars
(similar to light rail but with more frequent shared roadways) and rapid buses.
Rapid buses are distinguished from standard buses by their limited stops and
dedicated right-of-way for substantial portions of their routes. This allows
them to move passengers much more quickly than traditional buses and thus
are included as part of the rapid transit system.
Cities across the U.S. have developed rapid transit systems of different
types at various times over the last 150 years. Cities like Boston, New York,
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cleveland all built rail transit systems in the late
19th and early 20th centuries and continue to operate them today. Other cities
have built their systems much more recently, with places like Washington DC,
Los Angeles, Baltimore, Dallas, and Denver developing systems between the
1970s and the present. The scale of each of these systems varies substantially.
New York City’s rapid transit system contains 27 lines and over 450 individual
stations while Atlanta has only four lines with 38 stations. The growth of
these systems beginning in the 1970’s was also substantial. Figure 1 shows
the change in the number of rapid transit lines in each city from 1975 through
2014.3
2Some early adoption cities such as Boston have since added rapid bus and/or light rail
services.
3New York City is omitted since it is far higher than any other city. It had a constant
27 rapid transit lines over this period.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Rapid Transit Lines
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2.2.2 Drunk Driving in the U.S.
Drunk driving is a serious and persistent public safety issue in the U.S..
While there have been significant reductions in the number of drunk driving
deaths over the past few decades drunk driving still kills around 10,000 people
each year and injures hundreds of thousands. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) puts the annual direct economic cost of drunk
driving at $49 billion and the total societal cost at almost $200 billion.4 In
2012 there were approximately 121 million self-reported instances of drunk
driving.5 That same year over 1.2 million drivers were arrested for driving
under the influence.6
Almost all research into drunk driving has focused on factors affect-
ing the expected cost of driving drunk or policies that affect the amount of
alcohol consumption. Deterrence through increasing the probability of detec-
tion or increasing the severity of the punishment has been a primary focus.
Eisenberg (2003) examines the impact of laws regulating legal blood alcohol
content (BAC) when driving as well as other non-enforcement policies such as
graduated licensing7. Schultz et al (2001) look into more direct enforcement
4National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “The Economic and Societal Impact
Of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2010.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, May
2014, DOT HS 812 013. http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812013.pdf
5Jewett A, Shults RA, Banerjee T, Bergen G. (August 7, 2015) Alcohol-impaired driving
among adults— United States, 2012. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 64(30):814-
17.
6Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Crime in the United States: 2013.” Web. 26 May
2015.
7Graduated licensing is the practice of providing new drivers with restricted licenses
which become progressively less restrictive as the driver ages.
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mechanisms, finding significant reductions in fatal alcohol-related accidents
due to the use of sobriety checkpoints.
Recently, some studies have begun looking at the impact of alternative
transportation availability on drunk driving outcomes. Jackson and Owens
(2011) find that extending the operating hours of the Washington DC subway
resulted in localized reductions in DUI arrests, though little city-wide effect.
Greenwood and Wattal (2015) and Dills and Mulholland (2016) find reductions
in drunk driving measures after introduction of ridesharing services such as
Uber and Lyft. My paper expands on this growing literature by exploring
the impacts of not just the operating hours of public transit systems, but
their initial introduction. Public transit has many purposes beyond drunk
driving prevention, such as relieving traffic congestion, reducing pollution, and
easing parking constraints. When deciding to build or expand transit systems
policymakers need to have a solid understanding of both the costs and potential
benefits, along all dimensions, of these services. This paper helps to quantify
the benefit of rapid transit in terms of drunk driving prevention.
2.3 Analytic Framework
In this section I present a simple model of the decision process faced
by an individual who plans to consume alcohol. In the model, an individual
faces three decisions: whether to consume alcohol inside their home (H = 1)
or outside their home (H = 0), if they go out whether to self-drive (S = 1)
or take alternative transportation (S = 0), and finally how much alcohol to
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consume (D). The individual will select the values of these variables which
solve the utility maximization problem in Equation 1.
maximize
H,S,D
H · UH(D, βi,H) + (1−H) · S · UNH,S(D,PS, δi,S, βi,NH)
+(1−H) · (1− S) · UNH,NS(D,PNS, δi,NS, βi,NH)
(2.1)
In this equation, PS represents the price of self-driving and PNS is the
price of taking alternative transportation. These prices take into account the
convenience of each mode of transportation as well. β represents idiosyncratic
factors affecting the utility of consuming alcohol outside versus inside the
home and δ are idiosyncratic factors affecting the utility of self-driving versus
taking alternative transportation. UNH,NS(.) represents the utility received
from drinking outside the home and taking the individual’s most-preferred
form of alternative transportation.
Prior to rapid transit introduction, drunk drivers are those individuals
who optimally select to drink outside the home (H = 0), self-drive (S = 1), and
consume more alcohol than legally allowed when driving (D∗ > D̄). Within
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The introduction or expansion of rapid transit services affects this deci-
sion problem through the price of alternative transportation (PNS). For some
individuals, the convenience and cost of rapid transit will now make it their
most preferred form of alternative transportation. For a subset of these people,
going out using rapid transit will now give them the highest utility. Not all of
those who choose to use rapid transit would have driven drunk in its absence,
some would have stayed home, others would have used some other form of al-
ternative transportation, and still others would have self-driven but restricted
their alcohol consumption to a level at which they could drive legally. The
substitution that this study will measure does not include any of these groups.
The substitution I measure is for people who would have driven drunk prior
to rapid transit introduction (those who satisfy conditions in (2) above) but
who now optimally choose to take rapid transit instead. If there is significant
substitution of this type it should have an estimable impact on drunk driving
outcomes.
2.4 Data
Estimating the effect of rapid transit on drunk driving requires data on
both the availability of rapid transit and data on drunk driving outcomes for
cities around the U.S.. I have gathered the following data for 16 U.S. cities
with rapid transit systems covering 1975 through 2014.
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2.4.1 Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities
Since 1975 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
collects data on every fatal auto accident in the U.S. through their Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS). These data include information about the
vehicles, their occupants, the time and location of the accident, and impor-
tantly whether alcohol was a factor in the accident. I collected these data from
the earliest available year, 1975, through 2014 which is the latest year for which
data have been published. For the early years of data, before GPS systems
became widely available, locations were recorded as state, county, and city
identifiers. In the latest 15-20 years of data, geographic locations are recorded
via precise coordinates. Whenever available, I use the coordinate data to de-
termine which observations are in each sample city.8 When these data are
unavailable I use the city codes to match accidents to the sample cities. All
of the data are incident-level, so each observation represents a separate fatal
accident. After matching each observation to the sample cities I aggregate
them into total monthly fatal alcohol-related auto accidents for each city.
2.4.2 DUI/DWI Arrests
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through their Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) system collects data on monthly arrests for various crimes
from police departments across the U.S.. I collected monthly UCR reports
for DUI/DWI arrests for each municipal police agency in my city sample. I
8Any accident within 10 miles of the city centroid is considered within that city.
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gathered these data for 1980 through 2014. Reporting of DUI/DWI arrests
in the UCR program is voluntary, accordingly not every police agency reports
these arrest statistics every month. For the cities in my sample, half of them
report data for over 93% of the months between 1980 and 2014. All but four
report data for at least 78% of months, and all but two report data for over
39% of months. Two cities, Chicago and Washington DC, report for only a
small proportion of months. Excluding them from the following analyses does
not affect the results.
2.4.3 Rapid Transit System Data
Determining whether rapid transit had any effect on fatal accidents
requires data on how the availability of rapid transit has changed over the
sample period. For each of the cities in my sample I gathered data for each
line and station in their rapid transit system.9 For each transit line I have the
date when it first began operation. For each station I have the opening date
of the station, information on which lines stop at the station, the date each
line began operating at that station, and an indicator for whether the station
is a connection between two or more lines. In many transit systems, two or
more lines will run parallel for a section of their route, stopping at all of the
same stations over that section. In these cases, I count the stations at which
the lines converge or diverge as connection stations while the intermediate
9All rapid transit system data were gathered from the corresponding municipal transit
authority.
67
shared stations are not counted as such. The purpose of including data on
line connections is to test whether more inter-connected systems are more
appealing under the theory that they provide more comprehensive coverage of
the city. These data provide several measures for the quality of a city’s rapid
transit system. For this analysis I calculate the total number of stations, the
total number of transit lines, and the total number of line connections in each
sample city’s rapid transit system in each month between 1975 and 2014.
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Econometric Model
To quantify any potential effects rapid transit services had on fatal
alcohol-related auto accidents in the sample cities I use a fixed effects difference-
in-differences methodology. Between 1975 and 2014, 10 of the sample cities
developed their rapid transit systems while the systems in the remaining six
cities remained largely static, having been built out during the early 20th cen-
tury. The cities whose systems were already established by 1975 effectively act
as a control group for the treatment cities which built their systems over the
late 20th and early 21st centuries. I estimate Equation 3 using Negative Bi-
nomial estimation techniques because the outcomes of interest (fatal accidents
and DUI arrests) are discrete count variables.
yi,t = α0 + βZi,t + γXi,t + δi + φt + εi,t (2.3)
In this equation, yi,t represents the measure of drunk driving prevalence
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which for this analysis are the numbers of fatal alcohol-related auto accidents
and DUI/DWI arrests each month. Zi,t is a vector of potential measures
of rapid transit system quality such as number of stations, number of lines,
and/or number of line connections for city i at time t. β is the coefficient of
interest for this analysis, it captures the effect of these rapid transit measures
on drunk driving outcomes. Xi,t is a vector of other potentially important
covariates such as city population and state unemployment rates. δi and φt
are a full set of city and time fixed effects.
2.5.2 Identification
Identification of the causal effect of rapid transit systems comes from
their gradual and staggered development. Rapid transit, particularly rail sys-
tems are large, expensive projects and typically take years or decades to com-
plete. Systems for the cities in my sample began operation at quite different
points in time. Washington DC opened its first heavy rail line in 1976 while
Miami’s didn’t open until 1984 and Los Angeles’ until 1990. This gradual roll
out of systems across cities allows me to estimate the causal effect of rapid
transit service independent of other time-specific factors. Figures 1 and 2
graphically presents the number of lines and stations, respectively, in opera-
tion in each sample city from 1975 through 2014.10 This in conjunction with
10New York City is excluded due to its unusually large number of lines and stations. Over
the entire period it had a constant 27 lines and 494 stations. For stations, Philadelphia and
San Francisco are excluded as well since their street-car lines have a very large number of
stations. Each has a constant number of stations over the full sample period.
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Figure 2.2: Number of Rapid Transit Stations
the difference-in-differences approach which uses the control cities to remove
any trends in drunk driving outcomes as well as any seasonal variation that is
common across cities allows me to make causal inference about the effects of
rapid transit.
2.6 Results
Table 1 presents the results of estimating Equation 3 using the number
of rapid transit lines as the measure of system size. Specifications (1) through
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(3) presents Negative Binomial estimates of the effect of adding additional
rapid transit lines on monthly fatal alcohol-related auto accidents. Each model
progressively adds more control variables. Specification (1) controls linearly for
city population. Specification (2) adds quadratic population controls. Finally,
specification (3) adds controls for city economic and demographic factors.11
The results indicate that adding an additional transit line reduces fatal alcohol-
related accidents by 11.5% to 13.8%.12 Specifications (4) through (6) in Table 1
present the same estimations using DUI/DWI arrests as the dependent variable
rather than fatal alcohol-related accidents. The effects of adding additional
rapid transit lines on DUI/DWI arrests are very similar to the effects on fatal
accidents, with reductions of 12.7% to 14.4% from adding additional lines.
The number of lines is not the only potential measure of a rapid transit
system’s size. A transit line is potentially less useful if it only serves a limited
number of stations. Accordingly, I also estimate the effect of adding additional
rapid transit stations on drunk driving outcomes. Table 2 presents the results
of this estimation. As in Table 1, specifications (1)-(3) present the effects on
fatal alcohol-related auto accidents and specifications (4)-(6) give the effects
on DUI/DWI arrests. The results indicate that each additional rapid transit
station reduces fatal alcohol-related accidents by 1% to 1.2%. The estimated
11The additional controls include state-level unemployment rates, poverty rates, the pro-
portions of the population which are children, elderly, male, and males aged 21-44 (each
included separately). Unemployment rates and population are annual, other covariates are
from decennial census data.
12The coefficients reported in the table represent the change in the mean of the natural
log of the number of fatal accidents. To convert these into percentage changes I calculate
exp(coefficient)− 1.
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Table 2.1: Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Lines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Lines -0.122∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.155∗∗
(0.060) (0.058) (0.051) (0.053) (0.050) (0.055)
Population -0.074∗ -0.006 -0.077 0.082 0.149 0.134
(0.031) (0.060) (0.059) (0.051) (0.103) (0.124)
Population2 -0.001+ -0.0000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemp. Rate 0.018 -0.063+
(0.035) (0.036)
Poverty Rate 0.015 -0.057
(0.040) (0.039)
Male % 0.372∗ 0.005
(0.152) (0.211)
Male (21-44) % -0.164 0.144
(0.133) (0.147)
Children (0-17) % -0.107 0.085
(0.068) (0.062)
Elderly (65+) % 0.106 0.101
(0.136) (0.103)
N 7680 7680 7488 5139 5139 5139
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
Fixed effects for city and month by year are included in the regressions but are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All models are estimated using Negative Binomial specification.
Population measures are in units of 100,000.
Rates and percentages are in percentage points.
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impact on DUI/DWI arrests is comparable, with each station reducing arrests
by 1.4% to 1.8%.
These results, both for additional transit lines and additional stations
indicate that increasing the size of a city’s rapid transit system has a significant
impact on drunk driving outcomes.13 Next I try to delve into the effect of the
comprehensiveness of a city’s rapid transit system. Here I jointly estimate the
effects of the number of rapid transit lines, the number of stations per line,
and the number of connections between lines. Table 3 presents the results of
this estimation.
As in the previous two tables, the first three specifications examine the
impact on fatal alcohol-related accidents and the last three look at the effect
on DUI/DWI arrests. Estimating each of these three measures jointly shows
that the impact of rapid transit systems on drunk driving outcomes seems to
be driven by the number of lines each system operates. Of the three measures
of system quality only the number of lines has a significant effect. The effects
of additional rapid transit lines on drunk driving outcomes are similar to those
presented in Table 1. I estimate in Table 3 that each additional line reduces
fatal alcohol-related accidents by 13.1% to 18.6%. For DUI/DWI arrests each
line corresponds to a 10.5% to 12.0% reduction. All of these results indicate
that increasing the size of a city’s rapid transit system significantly reduces
13The coefficients on city population indicate higher population corresponds with fewer
fatal alcohol-related accidents and more DUI/DWI arrests. The negative coefficient for fatal
accidents may be due to increased density and traffic congestion in larger cities, leading to
slower traffic speeds and fewer fatal crashes.
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Table 2.2: Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Stations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Stations -0.010+ -0.012∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population -0.073∗ -0.007 -0.080 0.100∗ 0.173+ 0.132
(0.030) (0.060) (0.055) (0.051) (0.101) (0.116)
Population2 -0.001 0.0000 -0.001 -0.005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.009)
Unemp. Rate 0.017 -0.046
(0.035) (0.038)
Poverty Rate 0.019 0.005
(0.038) (0.029)
Male % 0.378∗ 0.044
(0.158) (0.191)
Male (21-44) % -0.171 0.156
(0.137) (0.147)
Children (0-17) % -0.112+ 0.121∗
(0.068) (0.059)
Elderly (65+) % 0.124 0.169
(0.137) (0.108)
N 7680 7680 7488 5139 5139 5139
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
Fixed effects for city and month by year are included in the regressions but are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All models are estimated using Negative Binomial specification.
Population measures are in units of 100,000.
Rates and percentages are in percentage points.
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Table 2.3: Joint Impact of Rapid Transit Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Lines -0.177∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.111∗ -0.119∗ -0.128+
(0.056) (0.053) (0.041) (0.050) (0.048) (0.067)
Stations per Line 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Line Connections 0.034 0.042 0.004 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034)
Population -0.074∗∗ -0.007 -0.091 0.069 0.137 0.123
(0.029) (0.068) (0.064) (0.051) (0.115) (0.128)
Population2 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemp. Rate 0.013 -0.062+
(0.033) (0.036)




N 7680 7680 7488 5139 5139 5139
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
Fixed effects for city and month by year are included in the regressions but are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All models are estimated using Negative Binomial specification.
Population measures are in units of 100,000.




One potential concern about the interpretation of these estimates is
that the identifying variation might be driven by expansion of rapid bus ser-
vices rather than more traditional heavy and light rail transit services. While
rapid bus systems are much less common than rail services for the cities in
my sample all of them were developed during the sample period, potentially
increasing their influence on the estimates of rapid transit’s effects on drunk
driving. The concern is that this might limit the applicability of my estimated
effects to rail transit systems. To test this I repeat the estimation in Table
1 excluding rapid buses from the number of transit lines.14 Table 4 presents
these estimates. As each shows, removing rapid buses has no effect on the es-
timated reduction in fatal alcohol-related accidents or DUI/DWI arrests. This
demonstrates that the estimated effects are not driven primarily by rapid bus
services but rather apply to rail transit services as well.
Another concern regards statistical inference using clustered standard
errors. In all of my analyses I cluster standard errors at the city level. Cameron
and Miller (2015) show that clustering can lead to overly small standard errors
when the number of clusters is relatively small. Since the number of clusters
in my primary analyses is only 16 I re-estimate each specification clustering
14I also repeated the analysis in Tables 2 and 3 excluding rapid bus services and found
no change in those results.
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Table 2.4: Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Lines - Excluding Buses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Lines -0.118+ -0.144∗ -0.133∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.178∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.057) (0.057) (0.053) (0.057)
Population -0.075∗ -0.011 -0.085 0.083 0.156 0.119
(0.032) (0.065) (0.060) (0.054) (0.106) (0.122)
Population2 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemp. Rate 0.012 -0.068+
(0.033) (0.038)
Poverty Rate 0.013 -0.061
(0.041) (0.039)
Male % 0.394∗ 0.109
(0.157) (0.200)
Male (21-44) % -0.154 0.145
(0.132) (0.147)
Children (0-17) % -0.097 0.121∗
(0.073) (0.061)
Elderly (65+) % 0.132 0.158
(0.135) (0.108)
N 7680 7680 7488 5139 5139 5139
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the city level.
Fixed effects for city and month by year are included in the regressions but are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All models are estimated using Negative Binomial specification.
Population measures are in units of 100,000.
Rates and percentages are in percentage points.
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instead at the month level. Doing so increases the number of clusters from
16 to 480, which is sufficiently large for reliable statistical inference. Table
5 presents the results of estimating the effect of the number of rapid transit
lines on each of the drunk driving outcomes using date clustering. Contrary to
the concern drawn from Cameron and Miller (2015), the standard errors using
this larger number of clusters are substantially smaller than when I cluster at
the city level.15 This result provides some support that the standard errors I
estimate in my primary results are not significantly underestimated.
2.7 Conclusion
Drunk driving exacts a large cost, both in terms of lives lost and in eco-
nomic damage. Providing convenient, affordable transportation alternatives
represents a potential avenue to reducing this cost. Rapid transit systems have
the potential to move people around cities more quickly and efficiently than
traditional bus systems. Furthermore, they are typically far cheaper than pri-
vate transportation options such as taxis. Despite this potential, there is very
little research on the effects rapid transit have on drunk driving rates. In this
study I use the build out of rapid transit systems across the U.S. over the past
40 years to estimate the causal effect of these systems on fatal alcohol-related
auto accidents. Using a fixed effects difference-in-differences methodology I
estimate that expanding rapid transit systems significantly reduces both fatal
15I likewise find significantly smaller standard errors when re-estimating the specifications
in Tables 2 and 3 clustering at the date level.
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Table 2.5: Effects of Number of Rapid Transit Lines - Date Clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fatal Fatal Fatal DUI DUI DUI
Crashes Crashes Crashes Arrests Arrests Arrests
Lines -0.122∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Population -0.074∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.077∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.018)
Population2 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemp. Rate 0.014 -0.057∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
Poverty Rate 0.015+ 0.002
(0.008) (0.007)
Male % 0.372∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.039) (0.031)
Male (21-44) % -0.164∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.023)
Children (0-17) % -0.107∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016)
Elderly (65+) % 0.106∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.018)
N 7680 7680 7488 5139 5139 5139
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the date level.
Fixed effects for city and month by year are included in the regressions but are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All models are estimated using Negative Binomial specification.
Population measures are in units of 100,000.
Rates and percentages are in percentage points.
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alcohol-related auto accidents and DUI/DWI arrests. I find that adding an
additional rapid transit line reduces fatal accidents by 11.5% to 13.8% and
DUI/DWI arrests by 12.7% to 14.4%. Alternatively, using number of stations
as the measure of system size I find a 1% to 1.2% reduction in fatal accidents
and a 1.4% to 1.8% reduction in drunk driving arrests per additional station.
These results provide essential evidence for policymakers when weighing
the costs and benefits of building or expanding rapid transit systems in their
cities. The estimates above imply that each additional rapid transit line a city
builds results in on average four fewer fatal drunk driving accidents each year.
At a minimum this corresponds to a reduction of almost $40 million in damage
per line each year.16 These systems operate for many decades after they are
developed, meaning these benefits from drunk driving reduction will continue
to accumulate year after year.
16This assumes only a single death per fatal accident and uses the Department of Trans-
portation’s $9.1 million value for a statistical life. It does not include any other costs such




Residential Proximity to Late-Night Bus
Routes in Austin: Impact on DWI Arrests
3.1 Introduction
Despite improvements over the past few decades, drunk driving remains
a significant problem in the United States. Alcohol-related auto accidents
claim over 11,000 lives and result in over 326,000 injuries annually. These
accidents impose a substantial cost on society, with estimates of the harm
caused ranging from $44 billion to over $200 billion each year.1 In addition to
the harm caused by accidents, drunk driving poses a significant criminal justice
problem. In 2012, over 1.2 million US drivers were arrested for drunk driving2,
imposing significant cost in terms of enforcement, prosecution, and penalties
faced by those convicted. Accordingly, substantial time and resources have
been devoted to trying to reduce the incidence of drunk driving around the
country.
1National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. “The Economic and Societal Impact
Of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2010.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, May
2014, DOT HS 812 013. http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812013.pdf. Web. 6 March
2017.
2Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Crime in the United States: 2013.” Web. 6 March
2017.
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Most drunk driving prevention policies focus on deterrence through in-
creased police enforcement or stricter penalties. Such policies aim to make
drunk driving less appealing by increasing the expected cost of doing so, ei-
ther by increasing the likelihood of detection or increasing the punishments
if caught. For this reason, most of the academic research on drunk driving
prevention has focused on these deterrence methods as well. However, threat
of punishment is not the only potential way to deter drunk driving. Increas-
ing the availability and attractiveness of alternative forms of transportation
can potentially induce some people who would otherwise have driven drunk to
instead take other transportation.
Late-night public transit is often promoted as a potential tool for re-
ducing drunk driving. To date, limited research exists examining whether such
transit services do reduce drunk driving rates. One issue with measuring the
effectiveness of late-night transit is that not every person in a city has access
to these services. Late-night routes often cover only a subset of city transit
routes. Anyone who doesn’t live in close proximity to one of them will not be
able to use these services as an alternative to driving drunk.
In this paper, I take advantage of a unique dataset containing the home
addresses for every person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) by the
Austin Police Department to asses how the availability of late-night bus ser-
vices affects drunk driving outcomes. Using these home addresses along with
the fact that Austin’s late-night buses do not operate every day of the week I
estimate the causal impact of Austin’s late-night buses on DWI arrests for peo-
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ple who live within walking distance of one of these routes. This approach uses
a difference-in-differences methodology which compares the change in number
of DWI arrests for people living close to these routes from days of the week
without late-night bus service to days with such services to the correspond-
ing change for people who live farther away from these routes I estimate that
Austin’s late-night buses reduce DWI arrests by as much as 16.8% for those
living within a short walk of a late-night bus stop.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides
background on the problem of drunk driving in the U.S. as well as on Austin,
Texas’s late-night bus system. Section 3 describes the data sources used in
the analyses. Section 4 details the empirical methodology for identifying the
causal impact of Austin’s late-night buses on DWI arrests. Section 5 presents
the results of these estimates. Section 6 examines the robustness of these
results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Drunk Driving Prevalence and Prevention
Drunk driving remains a persistent problem across the U.S. Nationally,
over 11,000 people are killed each year in alcohol-related accidents. Over 1.2
million are arrested for driving under the influence annually. In Austin, Texas,
which is the focus of this study, DWI arrests average around 6,000 each year.
The costs imposed by both drunk driving and efforts to discourage it can be
substantial. Nationally, the costs imposed by fatal alcohol-related accidents
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range from $44 billion to as much as $200 billion each year. Arrests for DWIs
carry costs as well in terms of enforcement, prosecution, and lost productivity
of convicted offenders. Bouchery et al (2011) estimate the cost of this lost
productivity at $7.5 billion annually.
Common drunk driving prevention strategies can carry substantial costs
as well. Sobriety checkpoints are a common enforcement-based drunk driving
prevention method. Miller et al (1998) estimate that operating a single check-
point costs as much as $4,000 per hour. Enhanced police patrols will likewise
incur additional public costs in terms of personnel and equipment. These
strategies can be effective at reducing drunk driving, with Shults et al (2001)
showing that sobriety checkpoints can reduce fatal alcohol-related accidents
by 18-20%. One question for policymakers is whether these methods are a
cost-effective way to achieve reductions in drunk driving.
Enforcement strategies aim to deter drunk driving by increasing the
expected cost of doing so, either through increasing the likelihood of detection
or increasing the severity of punishment. This is only one possible method
for deterring drunk driving, however. When deciding to consume alcohol out-
side the home individuals face the choice between driving themselves (and
potentially driving under the influence on their return trip) or taking some al-
ternative form of transportation. Holding the available transportation options
fixed, increasing the expected cost of drunk driving makes the former less ap-
pealing relative to the latter. This decision can also be influenced by making
alternative transportation more appealing relative to self-driving. This can
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be accomplished by increasing the availability of alternative transportation
methods, increasing their convenience, or decreasing their cost. Greenwood
and Wattal (2015) and Dills and Mulholland (2016) have shown that increas-
ing the availability of alternative transportation can reduce rates of drunk
driving. Jackson and Owens (2011) look specifically at the effect of late-night
public transit in Washington D.C. and find significant, but highly localized
effects on drunk driving. They show that extended subway operating hours
reduce drunk driving arrests but only in neighborhoods with both subway
stations and large numbers of bars.
3.2.2 Late-Night Buses in Austin
There are previous studies which provide evidence that improving the
attractiveness of alternative transport relative to self-driving can reduce drunk
driving. It is possible that the availability of late-night public transit services
could reduce drunk driving as well. Austin, Texas operates two types of late-
night bus services. Their ”Night Owl” service consists of five routes which
cover a wide range of neighborhoods. The other late-night service is the ”En-
tertainment Bus” (E-Bus). This service consists of two routes and primarily
connects areas with large amounts of student housing to the downtown en-
tertainment districts. Both operate far later than the typical Austin transit
operating hours, running until 3:30 am. Standard buses in Austin typically
have final departures between 10:30 pm and 11:30 pm, depending on the route.
The Night Owl service operates Mondays through Saturdays while the E-Bus
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only operates Thursday through Saturday.
3.3 Data
The analyses in this study take advantage of a unique dataset provided
by the Austin Police Department. Most drunk driving studies rely on data
which at their most detailed only provide location information for the locations
where drunk driving accidents or arrests occur. These data are useful but not
ideal for measuring the impact of expanding public transit systems, as the
key to these systems’ usefulness in terms of drunk driving prevention stems
from their accessibility to potential drunk drivers’ homes. The data I use in
this study contain the home addresses for every person arrested for DWI by
the Austin police department from January 1, 2014 through November 30,
2015. These data allow me to calculate the number of DWI arrests for people
who live near a late-night bus route separately from the number of arrests for
people who do not. To determine which addresses are close to late-night bus
routes, I utilize the Google Maps Directions API to calculate the walking time
from each address to the closest late-night bus stop.3 This method finds the
closest late-night bus route (if applicable) to each address, so if an address is
close to both a Night Owl route and an E-Bus route I only count the closer of
the two bus services.
To supplement this direct treatment and outcome data I gathered
3Many addresses are too far from a late-night route for Google Maps to calculate a
walking time, I classify these addresses as not close to a late-night bus route.
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Zipcode-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Sur-
vey (ACS).4 I gathered data on Zipcode demographics for each of the 52 Zip-
codes in Austin for 2015. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the Zipcode-
level demographic data.
Table 3.1: Zipcode-Level Demographic Summary Statistics
Mean Min Max
Population 35,234 748 79,067
Age 21-44 Male % 23.1% 10.6% 37.3%
Rental HH % 54.6% 4.7% 88.8%
Unemployment Rate 6.2% 2.4% 15.6%
Median HH Income $58,606 $12,385 $132,980
Poverty % 19.6% 1.5% 66.4%
Less than HS % 15.4% 0.4% 40.0%
HS Grad % 42.3% 14.2% 58.9%
Post HS Educ. % 42.3% 9.8% 84.2%
These data allow me to explore demographic differences in numbers
of DWI arrests in Austin. While these are not causal estimates, correlations
between neighborhood demographics and DWI arrest rates can be informative
and the data I use in this study is uniquely suited to explore this. For this
4ACS data gathered using the U.S. Census Bureau’s American FactFinder at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml.
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estimation I use the same group definitions described above, but separate each
group by Zipcode. This means that for each Zipcode in each day there is an
observation containing the total number of arrests for people in that Zipcode
who fall into each of the three groups determined by their home’s proximity
to a late-night bus route.5 Table 2 presents the results of regression analysis
on the influence of Zipcode demographics on the number of DWI arrests.
All specifications include time fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the
Zipcode level.
Areas with higher populations tend to have higher numbers of DWI
arrests. Further, I find that the larger the proportion of the population that is
made up of young males (a particularly high-risk group for drunk driving), the
more observed DWI arrests. Economic factors do not appear to play a large
role in DWI arrests in the data. Unemployment rate, median income, and
the poverty rate having small and mostly insignificant effects. The only other
factors that appear to be associated with different levels of DWI arrests are
education and the proportion of households who rent rather than own their
home. The proportion of rental households is associated with a significantly
higher number of DWI arrests. The proportion of residents who did not finish
high school is associated with a small but highly significant increase in arrests.
While none of these results imply any causal impact of these factors on DWI
arrests, it may be useful to policymakers to understand the neighborhood
characteristics that tend to be associated with higher rates of drunk driving.
5Some Zipcodes are not served by one or both of the types of late-night bus services.
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Table 3.2: Zipcode-Level Demographic Regressions
(1) (2)
DWI Arrests DWI Arrests
Population 0.801∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.098)
Age 21-44 Male % 0.672∗ 0.620∗
(0.285) (0.267)
Rental HH % 0.403∗ 0.451∗∗
(0.160) (0.162)
Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Median Income 0.002+ 0.002+
(0.001) (0.001)
Poverty % -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Less than HS % 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
HS Grad % -0.001 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002)





Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the Zipcode level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications use Poisson estimation.
Population is in units of 100,000 people.
Median income is per household in units of $1,000.
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To estimate the causal effects of Austin’s late-night buses on DWI ar-
rests, comparing the number of DWI arrests for people who live close to late-
night bus routes to those who don’t is insufficient. Any differences between
the two groups could be purely compositional, with different types of people
living in areas close to such routes than those who do not. To properly esti-
mate the effect of late-night buses I rely on the fact that these services do not
operate every day of the week. Austin’s ”Night Owl” bus routes only operate
Monday through Saturday. The ”Entertainment Buses” (E-Bus) only oper-
ate Thursdays through Saturdays. This variation allows me to compare the
change between days when these services do not operate to days when they
do for each group of addresses. I separate the DWI arrests into three groups,
those that live close to one of the ”Night Owl” routes, those that live close
to one of the ”Entertainment Bus” (E-Bus) routes, and those that live close
to neither. Table 3 presents summary statistics for each group and day of the
week. Figure 1 shows graphically how the average number of arrests for each
group vary by day of the week. All three groups follow a similar pattern, with




To estimate the potential causal impact of Austin’s late-night bus ser-
vices I use a fixed effects difference-in-differences approach. For each group I
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Table 3.3: DWI Arrests Summary Statistics by Late-Night Bus Proximity and
Day of the Week
Control Night Owl E-Bus
Sunday
Mean 12.44 2.18 0.64
Std. Dev. (3.73) (1.49) (0.88)
Monday
Mean 7.38 1.13 0.28
Std. Dev. (2.83) (1.13) (0.53)
Tuesday
Mean 6.36 1.02 0.25
Std. Dev. (2.38) (0.98) (0.48)
Wednesday
Mean 7.80 1.08 0.35
Std. Dev. (3.56) (1.04) (0.58)
Thursday
Mean 10.04 1.41 0.37
Std. Dev. (3.36) (1.11) (0.61)
Friday
Mean 11.95 1.50 0.60
Std. Dev. (3.91) (1.30) (0.87)
Saturday
Mean 15.31 2.37 0.67
Std. Dev. (4.03) (1.69) (0.83)
*Night Owl and E-Bus groups are within a 5-minute walk.
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Figure 3.1: Average DWI Arrests by Day of the Week
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create an indicator for whether on that day they have access to each of the two
types of late-night bus services. For addresses not near either of the late-night
bus types these indicators are always equal to zero. For addresses located near
one of the routes these indicators equal one on days the services are operating
and zero otherwise.
yi,t = α0 + β1NightOwli,t + β2EBusi,t + δi + φt + εi,t (3.1)
In this estimation equation NightOwli,t is an indicator for whether
the Night Owl late-night bus service is available for group i on date t. As
described previously, there are three “groups”: one for people who live within
walking distance of a “Night Owl” route; one for people who live within walking
distance of an “E-Bus” route; and one for people who live near neither. EBusi,t
is an indicator for whether the Entertainment Bus late-night service is available
for group i on date t. For each of these, the indicator will always equal zero if
group i does not live near the respective late-night bus route. Each acts as an
interaction term between an indicator for whether the service is operating and
an indicator for whether group i is the group within walking distance of that
late-night service. β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest, representing the
effect of late-night bus services on DWI arrests. δi and φt represent group and
date fixed effects, respectively. These fixed effects control for any time-specific
factors that are common across all Austin residents as well as for any time-




It is possible that there is significant variation in the average level of
DWI arrests in different areas of the cities, even amongst those with access
to the same types of late-night buses. To test for this I expand the group
definition described in Section 3 to include Zipcode information. Now there
will be a separate group for each of the three original groups (lives close to
Night Owl bus, lives close to Entertainment Bus, and lives close to neither)
for each Zipcode. Not every Zipcode will have each of the three groups, as
some are not served by one (or by either) of the late-night bus routes.6 The
estimation equation for this version is as follows.
yi,z,t = α0 + β1NightOwli,z,t + β2EBusi,z,t + δi,z + φt + εi,z,t (3.2)
The only difference between this and the previous estimation equation
is that the level of observation is now at the Zipcode-group-date level. This
permits a larger set of group fixed effects by Zipcode rather than simply group
fixed effects. This additional granularity controls for any differences in the
average level of DWI arrests for people across all possible Zipcode and group
combinations.




Identification in these empirical models comes from the difference-in-
differences approach I use. It is possible to compare the change from days
without late-night bus service to days with these services, and then contrast
this change for people who live near late-night bus lines with the same change
for those who do not. This approach allows the estimation of the causal
impact Austin’s late-night bus services have on DWI arrests. The underlying
assumption in this identification strategy is that absent the late-night bus
services the change between days when the services don’t operate to the days
in which they do would follow a similar pattern for each of the groups. While
this assumption is not directly testable using the DWI arrest data in this study,
there is a very consistent pattern across different cities and states as well as
over time in the rate of both drunk driving arrests as well as drunk driving
accidents in which they increase significantly during the weekend compared
to weekdays. It is not unreasonable to assume that a similar pattern exists
among residents in different areas of the same city, though further research
into these patterns would be informative.
Since identification in this study relies upon variation in transit avail-
ability by day of the week rather than using the initial launch of these late-
night services there are some factors which could bias my estimates of the
effect these services have on drunk driving. It is possible that people who live
near a late-night bus route might shift their drinking to nights of the week on
which the services operate. If this happens that would potentially result in
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fewer DWI arrests on days when late-night services aren’t operating for peo-
ple who live near late-night bus stops. This would bias my estimates towards
finding a smaller effect of late-night buses on drunk driving.
Potential drunk drivers aren’t the only ones who might have a behav-
ioral response to these bus services. Police looking for drunk drivers might
adjust their target areas based on where the late-night buses operate, target-
ing areas without these services for greater scrutiny on days when the buses
operate. This could potentially bias my estimates towards finding a greater ef-
fect of late-night buses on drunk driving because it could increase the observed
arrests for the control group relative to the treatment group independent of
the number of people in each group who actually drive drunk. This may not be
a significant concern as it would require drunk drivers who live near late-night
bus routes to mostly drive near these routes and conversely for drunk drivers
who do not live near them to primarily drive away from the routes. Since
the late-night routes serve central entertainment districts and run along major
corridors it is unlikely that police officers would significantly shift their drunk
driving enforcement away from these areas on days the late-night services run,
which are also high-risk days for drunk driving.
Finally, it is important to consider the external validity of these esti-
mates. It is very likely that the days of the week chosen for late-night bus
operation were done to maximize their utilization. For the “E-Bus” espe-
cially, the Thursday through Saturday operation covers the highest-risk days
for drunk driving. This means that my estimated effects of these services may
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be greater than the effect would be if these services began operating on other,
lower-risk days of the week. This study also uses data on DWI arrests and
late-night bus service for only a single city, Austin, Texas. The effect of simi-
lar services on other cities might differ from the effects in Austin. Preferences
for public transit, population density, location of drinking establishments, and




To estimate the effects of Austin’s late night buses on DWI arrests I
begin by grouping the home addresses for people arrested for DWI into three
groups: those who live within walking distance of a Night Owl bus route; those
who live within walking distance of an Entertainment Bus (E-Bus) route; and
those who don’t live close to either. As I described in Section 3, I use the
Google Maps Directions API to calculate the walking time to the closest late
night bus stop. To classify each address into one of these three groups I use
four different definitions of ”walking distance”: within 5 minutes, 10 minutes,
15 minutes, and 20 minutes. I estimate the effect of the late night bus services
under each of these four definitions.
I use the actual count of DWI arrests for each group for each day in
my estimation. Accordingly, I utilize Poisson estimation techniques to account
for the distribution of observed daily DWI arrests. I begin by estimating the
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effects using fixed effects for the ”group” as previously described as well as fixed
effects for day of the week, calendar month, and year. I cluster all standard
errors at the group level. Table 4 presents the results of this estimation for
each definition of ”walking distance” from a late-night bus route. The first and
second row give the estimated effect of each of the two late-night bus services
on DWI arrests.
For people who live very close (within a 5-minute walk) of one of the
Night Owl bus routes I estimate that the availability of these services reduces
the incidence of DWI arrests by 16.8%. For the E-Bus service, I find no effect
of their presence on DWI arrests for people living within a 5-minute walk of an
E-Bus stop. As I expand the distance from the late-night bus stops the effect
of the Night Owl buses decreases but remains a 6.5% to 7.7% reduction in
the number of DWI arrests for people who live within a 10-20 minute walking
distance of the stops. For the E-Bus service the effect on DWI arrests increases
as I expand the walking distance radius. While effects remain imprecisely
estimated, the point estimates of the reduction in DWI arrests increase to a
4.8% to 6.6% reduction for a walking radius of 10-20 minutes from the E-Bus
stops. The difference in DWI reduction between the two types of late-night
bus services may be driven by the different populations each serves. The E-
Bus service focuses on areas with large amounts of student housing, while
the Night Owl service covers a much broader range of neighborhoods. The
coefficient estimates for the group living in close proximity to an E-Bus route
shows that this population is substantially less likely to be arrested for DWI
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Table 3.4: City-wide Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 5 Within 10 Within 15 Within 20
Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk
Treat Night Owl -0.184∗∗∗ -0.067∗ -0.074∗ -0.080∗
(0.013) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037)
Treat E-Bus -0.013 -0.053 -0.068+ -0.049
(0.009) (0.033) (0.037) (0.052)
Day of Week
Monday -0.526∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.035) (0.041) (0.055)
Tuesday -0.666∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.661∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045)
Wednesday -0.478∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034)
Thursday -0.230∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(0.022) (0.073) (0.084) (0.078)
Friday -0.058∗ -0.065+ -0.056+ -0.050
(0.026) (0.035) (0.030) (0.060)
Saturday 0.209∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
Near Night Owl -1.748∗∗∗ -1.170∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
Near E-Bus -3.108∗∗∗ -2.700∗∗∗ -2.510∗∗∗ -2.367∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027)
N 2097 2097 2097 2097
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the late-night bus proximity group level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications include calendar month and year fixed effects and use Poisson estimation.
Addresses are “near” a bus route if they are within the specified walking distance.
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on average than those living in other areas.
I next estimate the same models but instead of using fixed effects for
day of the week, calendar month, and year, I use a full set of date fixed effects.
This potentially controls better for variation over time, though at a cost of
estimation power due to the large number of fixed effects. Table 5 presents
the results of this estimation. The estimates of the effect of each type of
late-night bus service do not change with the inclusion of the full date fixed
effects. These results can be used to infer that the day of the week, calendar
month, and year fixed effects are properly capturing variation over time that
is common to all three groups.
3.5.2 Zipcode-level Results
It is possible that there is heterogeneity among residents in different
parts of the city, even if they fall into the same group in terms of access to
late-night bus transit. To account for residential location differences, I separate
the DWI arrest addresses by both late-night bus group and by Zipcode. Table
6 presents the results using day of the week, calendar month, and year fixed
effects as well as a full set of Zipcode by group fixed effects. All standard errors
are clustered at the Zipcode by group level. Inclusion of the Zipcode-level fixed
effects has no impact on the point estimates of the impact of the late-night
bus services, though it does substantially increase the standard errors.
As with the city-wide estimates, I also estimate the Zipcode-level effects
using a full set of date fixed effects to more precisely control for variation over
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Table 3.5: City-wide Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests - Full FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 5 Within 10 Within 15 Within 20
Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk
Treat Night Owl -0.184∗∗∗ -0.067∗ -0.074∗ -0.080∗
(0.013) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037)
Treat E-Bus -0.013 -0.053 -0.068+ -0.049
(0.009) (0.033) (0.037) (0.052)
Near Night Owl -1.748∗∗∗ -1.169∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
Near E-Bus -3.108∗∗∗ -2.700∗∗∗ -2.510∗∗∗ -2.367∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027)
N 2097 2097 2097 2097
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the late-night bus proximity group level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications include date fixed effects and use Poisson estimation.
Addresses are “near” a bus route if they are within the specified walking distance.
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Table 3.6: Zipcode-Level Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 5 Within 10 Within 15 Within 20
Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk
Treat Night Owl -0.184+ -0.067 -0.074 -0.080
(0.100) (0.075) (0.070) (0.067)
Treat E-Bus -0.013 -0.053 -0.068 -0.049
(0.061) (0.055) (0.061) (0.054)
Day of Week
Monday -0.526∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.056) (0.053) (0.057)
Tuesday -0.666∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.661∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.067)
Wednesday -0.478∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.059) (0.065) (0.067)
Thursday -0.230∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.065)
Friday -0.058 -0.065 -0.056 -0.050
(0.039) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050)
Saturday 0.209∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.048)
N 53124 53124 53124 53124
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the late-night bus proximity group level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications include calendar month and year fixed effects and use Poisson estimation.
Addresses are “near” a bus route if they are within the specified walking distance.
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time that is common across groups and Zipcodes. The results are presented
in Table 7. As in the city-wide results, adding the full date fixed effects has
no impact on the estimated effect of either late-night bus service.
Table 3.7: Zipcode-Level Effects on DWI Arrests - Full FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 5 Within 10 Within 15 Within 20
Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk
Treat Night Owl -0.184+ -0.067 -0.074 -0.080
(0.100) (0.075) (0.070) (0.067)
Treat E-Bus -0.013 -0.053 -0.068 -0.049
(0.061) (0.055) (0.061) (0.054)
N 53124 53124 53124 53124
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the late-night bus proximity group by Zipcode level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications include date fixed effects and use Poisson estimation.
Addresses are “near” a bus route if they are within the specified walking distance.
3.5.3 Robustness
A concern when using clustered standard errors is their reliability when
the number of clusters is small. Cameron and Miller (2015) demonstrate that
small numbers of clusters can lead to artificially small standard errors. My
primary analysis clusters at the “group” level, meaning there are only three
clusters in the city-wide estimates. To ensure that the standard errors I cal-
culate are not significantly underestimated I repeat the estimation in Table 5
clustering at the date level instead of the group level. This results in 699 clus-
ters instead of the three used in the original analysis. This level of clustering
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accounts for correlation in the errors across “groups” within a particular day.
This is reasonable, as day-specific factors such as weather or special events
could affect not only the level of DWI arrests, which are captured by the date
fixed effects, but also the variability. The results of this estimation are pre-
sented in Table 8. As Cameron and Miller (2015) demonstrate, it appears that
the small number of clusters used in Table 5 resulted in significantly under-
estimated standard errors. Correcting for this by clustering at the date level
results in the same 16.8% reduction in DWI arrests for people who live within
a five-minute walk of a Night Owl bus stop but no statistically significant effect
for those who live farther away or for those living near an E-Bus stop.
3.6 Conclusion
Drunk driving is a persistently common problem in the U.S., causing
over 11,000 deaths and 326,000 injuries annually. Around 1.2 million Amer-
icans are arrested each year for driving under the influence. Accordingly,
discouraging individuals from driving drunk is an important issue for poli-
cymakers around the country. Traditional prevention methods tend to focus
on discouragement through increased enforcement and enhanced penalties for
those caught driving drunk. Most academic research has focused on measuring
the effectiveness of these types of strategies.
Increasing the expected cost of drunk driving isn’t the only potential
method for reducing the incidence of drunk driving. Increasing the availabil-
ity and attractiveness of alternative forms of transportation can potentially
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Table 3.8: City-wide Effects of Late-Night Buses on DWI Arrests - Date Clus-
tering
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 5 Within 10 Within 15 Within 20
Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk Minute Walk
Treat Night Owl -0.184∗ -0.067 -0.074 -0.080
(0.080) (0.071) (0.065) (0.065)
Treat E-Bus -0.013 -0.053 -0.068 -0.049
(0.119) (0.107) (0.104) (0.102)
Near Night Owl -1.748∗∗∗ -1.170∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.065) (0.059) (0.060)
Near E-Bus -3.108∗∗∗ -2.700∗∗∗ -2.510∗∗∗ -2.367∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.077) (0.075) (0.074)
N 2097 2097 2097 2097
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the date level.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
All specifications include date fixed effects and use Poisson estimation.
Addresses are “near” a bus route if they are within the specified walking distance.
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induce some people who would otherwise drive drunk to instead take alter-
native transportation. In Austin, Texas, late-night bus services provide an
alternative way for people who live near their routes to get to and from drink-
ing establishments.
In this study I take advantage of the fact that Austin’s late-night bus
services only operate on some days of the week to use a difference-in-differences
approach to identify the impact of these services on DWI arrests. Using a
unique dataset containing the home addresses for everyone arrested for DWI
by the Austin Police Department I find that Austin’s Night Owl late night bus
service substantially reduces DWI arrests for people who live near one of the
Night Owl bus stops. I estimate that this bus service reduces DWI arrests for
people living within a five-minute walk of a Night Owl bus stop by 16.8%. For
people who live farther from these lines, within 10-20 minute walk of a bus
stop, the reduction in DWI arrests is 6.5-7.7% and is imprecisely estimated.
Austin’s Entertainment Bus, which serves areas of the city with substantial
amounts of student housing has a more limited effect on DWI arrests, with
imprecisely-estimated reductions of 1.3-6.6%.
These results add to the small but growing literature on the effects
of alternative transportation on drunk driving. Quantifying the impacts of
services like late-night buses can help provide policymakers with evidence to
better weigh the costs of such services against the potential benefits. Addi-
tionally, it allows them to compare the costs and benefits, in terms of drunk
driving prevention, of increasing the availability of alternative transportation
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versus traditional enforcement-based prevention strategies.
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